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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on Court of Appeals by Utah Code Annotated
78-2a-3(h)
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issues to be determined by the Appellate Court chiefly resolve
around whether court overstepped its bounds when it issued a permanent
protective order when virtually the only allegation that court should have
considered was that Mr. Cline (Appellant) had called Julie (Appellee) and
asked about how he could get his boys that she had been watching for the
weekend. When she persisted in questioning Mr. Cline about what his
intentions were, he commented "what are you afraid I am going to come and
beat you up? Well I am not." In spite of all the numerous allegations that
Julie made, that was the only one that should be considered by the court to

determine if Mr. Cline had done anything worthy of a protective order. Such
a position as taken by the trial court is not supported by Utah Code and as
such becomes a Rule of Law. Other issues surrounding this case revolve
around issues of Res Judicata as all the other claims that were made by Julie
were previously made in other court settings, as well as Utah Code
Annotated 78-7-19 which prohibit making repeated requests for orders
involving the same incidences.
There are some Constitutional issues surrounding the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment. The constitutional issues resolve around due
Process violations in that Mr. Cline was incarcerated and requested use of
law books from the county jail and was denied his request to properly
prepare for the hearing, even though he had made it clear in his request that
he was representing him self. (See Exhibit Page # 39). A Federal Court has
already decided an issue similar to this.1 The other constitutional issues
revolve around due process for the claim of denial of rights to equal
protection under the laws due to Gender Discrimination by Utah Trial
Courts. There are also due process issues surrounding the proper use of
mandated forms, the requirement that any petition for protective order be

Milton v, Morris 767 F.2d 1443 (1985)
£

verified and the mandated requirement that Petitioner inform court of other
pending actions.

DETERMINATIVE ISSUES
a. Issue Number One:

First Issue to be determined by the

Court is whether a Petition for Ex Parte Protective Order that is
not verified as required by UCA 30-6-4(4), can be the basis for
a protective order. This should be reviewed by the court as a
correction of error giving no deference to the trial courts
conclusions.
b. Issue Number Two:

Whether Trial court errorfd in signing

an ex party protective order in which the court approved form
mandated by statute in UCA 30-6-4 was not filled out properly.
One of the purposes of the form is to ensure that parties
requesting a protective order fulfill the obligation mandated by
UCA 30-6-4.1 to inform the court of other pending actions
including any previous protective orders, juvenal court actions
and divorces. Mr. Cline was denied due process rights and
severely prejudiced in his defense because if Julie had followed
the law and disclosed previous protective orders, then almost all

7

of the incidences that she put in there would not have gotten
past the court clerk who reviews each petition to make sure that
those issues previously requested are not brought up again.
This should be reviewed as a Correction of Error with no
deference being given to the trial courts legal conclusions.
c. Issue Number Three:

Whether the trial court was in error

when it allowed evidence to be admitted which had been
previously litigated and or orders requested on the same
incidents before. This is in violation of UCA 78-7-19. It is also
goes against previous rulings of Utah Court of Appeals and or
The Utah Supreme Court in regards to the legal principle of Res
Judicata

. This should be reviewed as a Correction of Error

with no deference being given to the trial courts legal
conclusions.
d. Issue Number Four:

Whether Trial Court errored when it

issued a protective order in which there was no evidence
submitted that would qualify as Abuse, mandated by State
Code. UCA 30-6-1 provides the definition of Abuse for a

2

Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc. 758 P.2d 451 (UT
APP. 1988)
3
Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc. 669 P.2d 875 (UT 1983)
8

protective order. Within that definition the statute mandated
"Intentionally or Knowingly" causing a cohabitant reasonable
fear of imminent physical harm. It also describes Domestic
Violence as the same as UCA 77-36-1. That statute involves
"any criminal Offense...". In spite of all Julies accusations,
not one of them has ever reached the point of "Criminal"
charges therefore none of her accusations should be considered
as the basis of cohabitant abuse as defined by statute. Mr. Cline
is not waving his right to argue that many of them didn't
happen at all or her version was so distorted that it didn't even
approach the standard to truth. This is also a statutory
interpretation and should be reviewed for correctness, not
giving any deference to the trial courts legal conclusions,
e. Issue Number Five:

Whether Mr. Clines constitutional

rights guaranteeing equal protection under the laws and
complete absence of discrimination on the basis of gender have
been violated. In the two years that Mr. Cline and Julie have
been involved in the divorce process, she has filed three
protective orders. Court in this case concluded that "you can

get a protective order based upon one shout for example".4 Yet
Mr. Cline has filed two different protective orders and the first
one involved Julie physically scratching the arm of her, at the
time, 14 year old boy while she was holding his arm behind his
back to make him do the dishes. When he refused, she dug
three fingers into his arm and scratched all the way the full
length of his foreann. The middle finger left a scar that is about
six inches long. About a year later her thirteen year old son
who has some learning disabilities was swearing at her so she
wrapped his arms behind his back and tied him up with Duck
Tape. When he started after that to kick at her she got a
younger brother to hold him down while she wrapped his legs
in tape. When he swore at her she stuck a sock in his mouth
and then put duck tape across his mouth. It is clear that in Utah
Trial Courts a women can come in and say "my husband yelled
in my face" and get a protective order, but if a man comes in
with events that clearly meet the definition of abuse, by statute,
that protective orders will still not be issued. This is in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and should be reviewed

4

Second Transcript, PP 6, Line 18-20. Exhibit pp 54
m

for civil rights violations in accordance with Federal Law. This
is a statutory interpretation and should be reviewed for
correctness regardless of the trial courts legal conclusions,
f. ISSUE NUMBER SIX: Whether court was in error when it
failed to dismiss Counsel for Petitioner, Steve Wall, from the
proceedings for having a conflict of interest. This motion had
already been herd in Divorce Court involving all the same
parties as well as Judge Hilder. Several days after this hearing
an evidentiary hearing was held by Judge Hilder on the
disqualification issues and disqualification was denied.
Subsequent to that an Extraordinary Writ was filed in this court
Case # 20040130 - CA. The writ was denied on the basis that
Mr. Cline needed to find a good reason that the disqualification
couldn't be taken care of in an ordinary appeal. Mr. Cline will
include a copy of the petition for extoradinary writ, as an
appendix to this appeal. The issue to be reviewed are three
fold. Judge Hilder concluded that "contact had been made and
information shared", but stated that an attorney client
relationship wasn't established. Mr. Cline argues that court
erred in that numerous Federal and State Court of Appeals,

opinions have shown that an implied client relationship
automatically occurs when a party shares information with an
attorney that he reasonably believes is acting as his attorney.5
Court also errored because it didn't use the "High Standard" of
refuting the evidence against disqualification and resolving any
doubt in favor of Disqualification.6 Court also errored as Rule
4.3 states that an attorney shouldn't even talk with an unrepresented person about a case unless it is to tell them to seek
council. It is clear that Mr. Wall should have been dismissed
from this as well as the divorce case, (see copy of Extraordinary
Writ, included as exhibit for all of arguments.)

STATEMENT OF CASE
Although the specific case being appealed from originated with
the filing of an Ex Party protective order by Petitioner, Julie Cline
Camp, on November 20, 2003, the issues actually began on or about
March 1, 2002, with her initial protective order filed on that day. Case
# 024901277 CA On or about March 4, 2002, Earl Cline, Appellant,

5

Poly Software v. Yu Su, 880F. Supp 1847
Nelson v. Green Builder Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1493
6
LaSalle Nat'l Bank 703 F.2d 257
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filed a different protective order against Julie (Appellee), in which he
alleges all sorts of physical abuse by Julie against the children. Case #
024901388 CA. A hearing was held on March 21, 2002 and
protective orders were stipulated to be dismissed. Julie was given till
April 11, 2002 to file for divorce and then protective order was to be
dismissed. Of note, the one child that Julie had alleged that Earl had
abused was oldest son Robert. Robert had been placed under
Jurisdiction of the Juvenal Court several months earlier. During the
three weeks that Robert was under custody of his mother, Julie had
him committed to Juvenal Detention because she and he were fighting
so badly. On March 21, 2002 in the afternoon Julie and Earl met at
Third district Juvenal court in front The Honorable Judge Johansson,
to decide what to do with Robert. At the hearing it was decided by
agreement with Julie and order of the Juvenal Court that Robert
should live with his Father (Appellant).
On April 11, 2002 Julie filed for divorce and the protective
order was dismissed.
On or about April 23, 2002 Julie filed for another protective
order. In this one she asked that she have her previously dismissed
protective order re-instated. Case # 024902553. She used incident at

Genesis in which she tried to show Mr. Cline as being physically
violent. She also accused him of stalking her old boy friend, and of
trying to break into her home. There were several other allegations.
The protective order was denied, but she was still given a hearing on
or about May 11, 2002 to try and convince a judge that she needed a
protective order. The hearing was held in Commissioner Casey's
court and he again denied the protective order.
On November 25, 2002, Mr. Cline tried to file a protective
order against Julie for her wrapping minor son Christopher's (age 13)
arms legs and mouth in duck tape because he was miss-behaving and
for throwing him against a wall and hurting his shoulder again when
she was upset at him. Case # 024907368 CA. Minor son Joshua (age
11) was also included in that as Julie had made Josh hold Chris down
so she could tape him up. The order was denied. Not only was the
order denied but Mr. Cline was also denied rights to due process by
not scheduling a hearing as required by UCA 30-6-4.3 (3). This is in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution as not only was due process denied, but the entire
protective order system as practiced by the courts in Utah is biased
towards women.

14

On March 6 2003 a stocking injunction was filed by Sharon
Packer, Julies mother, in I; 01 nth District court, in Heber. Case #
030500106 11 1 till 1 2 iii: 1 ji 11 ictiol 1 si ic listed issues related to Gei lesis,
allegations o f breaking into Julies home

-* n >n of :uikuK >f

Julies old boy friend, Allegations of child abuse against Robert, Chris
and Josh by Mr. Cline. Allegation o f coming into Julies home in
January o f 2003 in order to drop off the sleeping children w h e n Julie
ia; i a to come get them at the curbside as court ordered, Allegation
I

ii il: :) Ji 1L1.es 1 101 1 le ai id allegedly stolei 1 a cai

(u wab nib

written pen: 1 lission I \\legation that Mr.

Cline is harassing the Packers by fighting them in court when they
sued him for a mural Mi, Cline and Julie had painted, and many other
allegations, many of which have now found themselves included in
this latest November 20, 2003 ex party application for protective order
i

> A/ I lie! 1 is 1 io\ v 1:1 le si lbject oi "this appeal.
Again in a September 23, 2003 hearii lg 01 11\ lotioi 1 to SI 10w

Cause, Mr. Cline had to defend himself against these very same
allegations. At the end of the hearing Julie asked the court to re-issue
her protective order and the motion was denied. That Judge was the

Honorable Robert K. Hilder, the same Judge that issued the current
protective order.
In October 17, 2003 a trial was held in Third District Juvenal
Court, presided over by the Honorable Judge Arthur G. Christean. At
the trial the allegations that Mr. Cline had abused his children were
heard and dismissed completely. Case # 425964. Again they came up
on this protective order and Julie was there, testified and knew that
they were dismissed. She even tried to establish somehow that her
voluntary decision to testify against Mr. Cline was harassment on his
part. She has even in her petition for protective order tried to state
that Mr. Cline filing a motion for reconsideration of contempt issues
based upon rule 59 and 60 of Rules of Civil procedure is harassment
of her and her family.
On or about November 20, 2003, Julie filed an ex party
protective Order. The order was assigned to Judge Anthony B. Quin,
but he did not sign it. He turned it over to Judge Hilder, the Judge
presiding over the current divorce. On November 25, 2003, Mr. Cline
had a review hearing in Judge Hilder's court on Contempt and was
sentenced to the remaining 26 days in Jail. The hearing was
scheduled and Mr. Cline had to be transported from Salt Lake County

16

Metro to attend the Protective order heating. 11c contacted his h o l L i
iiini Mum .iml iislM'd lliciii lu provide tluiiiinenls lot roml

lutlge

I lildei refi ised to allow 1 ill i 11 : i lse thei i i '"1 liile in Salt Lake County
Metro. Earl informed the Jail staff that he was defending himself pro
se in court and needed various volumes of Utah Code. The request
was denied.
n

" December

I IUIIOI

<

.

* < .. Hearing was held in the coin" y -M
v\ ai lei it protect M

- .

grand

December 17, 2003 and an appeal

was filed by Appellant on December 19, 2003.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mr. Cline argues that numerous blatant errors were made by Julie in
filling out the forms, including failing to lia\c tin.' IViidun lor piotecliv i"
oi dei "verified", in itil aftei tl le oi dei was sigi led by tl le Ii ldge

Ii ilie also

failed to fill out the forms that required that she continue to keep court
informed as to other proceedings currently pending. These two errors alone
have caused enough prejudious to have the entire case dismissed. There is
the issue that Council for Petitioner, Steve Wall had a conflict of interest as
defined by Utah i <w fron
1

'

iegligen

»
"* •
17

i; ii >-

Pi t -v n-aibu

issues of Civil Rights Violations and Constitutional Amendment violations
on the part of the Trial Court. If not resolved here, Appellant will have the
right to take this appeal to a Writ of Habeas Corpus in Federal Court. There
are Issues of Res Judicata as well as conflict with State Statute for
continuality bringing in the same allegations. That issue alone is enough to
have the entire case thrown out. But even if none of these other issues didn't
exist, the fact remains that Julie simply didn't meet the burden of
establishing a need for a protective order based upon her allegations. She
alleged Child Abuse, but that was previously dismissed. She alleged assault,
but that was herd in contempt hearing and court concluded that "the court
finds insufficient evidence of violent grabbing of an arm or anything of the
kind". Court tried to argue that being present at Julies home during an
alleged incident when a car that belongs to Mr. Cline was taken out of a
garage is trespassing. Mr. Cline provided significant evidence at contempt
hearing that he had permission to take the car, and court refused to allow
admission of the evidence. That entire contempt order is being appealed as
soon as court signs final order. But even if all her allegations were true
about that incident, Standard of proof as detailed by UCA 77-36-1, is
"criminal offense". Contempt even if the allegations were true, are civil in
7

Civil # 024902228 DA, ORDER ON CONTEMPT HEARING HELD
SEPTEMBER 24, 2003. pp. 5 Paragraph 11
18

nature and standard of proof is very different than for a Criminal Off en.se
Finally Court stated that ""you can get a protective oulci based upon one
shout lor e\,iiiipk "'

1 U teal *|iiesiion lh.it e^ ei", oiii'

(i

ho re\ lews this

tmnscripl should ask themselves is, do you want the court to be able to take
your home, family, property and ability to see your children simply for the
fact that you shouted at your wife (or husband) even just once? The
argument is completely ludicrous and flies in the face of any Constitutional
rights to property, family associations, as well as riglr
other rights as guj:-J .M

,; n c, ^ 4 iw *

.

DETAIL OF ARGUMENT
Mr. Cline has shown that a number of the statues mandating what the
courts are to do prior to taking a persons rights guaranteed by the United
States Constitution including; Property Rights, Family Associations, even
possible imprisonment, were not followed it i tl lis c: ase. 1 1 :ie petitioi i for
protective CM dei was ;t lot i lotat ized \ n itil aftei the Ii icige signed the order.
Ji ilie failed tc it ICII ide any of the numerous cases in her Petition as required
by statute. There are Five Protective Order cases between these two parties.
There is a Divorce. There is a Juvenal Court Case which would leave any
orders from District Court regarding oldest son Robert invalid us .
8

Second Transcript, PP 6, Line 18-20.
1 O

S-

3a-104 states that Juvenal Court has "original and exclusive jurisdiction"
over any minor who has violated any federal, state, or local law. Therefore
any order made by District Court regarding Robert after he came under
Juvenal Court Jurisdiction in January of 2002, would be void, as District
court failed to acquire jurisdiction over Robert.9 "A commitment by a
justice of the peace for a crime not committed in his county is void for want
of jurisdiction and the party held hereunder is deprived of his liberty without
due process". 10 Even in the first protective order fled by Julie, she illegally
obtained control over Robert and started a chain reaction that has nearly
destroyed Roberts life.
There is a stalking injunction from Fourth District Court in Heber. In
each and every one of these cases, the same events and allegations are
repeated over and over. If Julie doesn't get the Judge to issue the order, she
changes the wording a little, makes up new allegations and tries again. The
result is an application for protective order in which she has now made over
forty allegations against Mr. Cline. Almost all of them had previously been
dismissed, in most cases, several times. Mr. Cline has numerous times
refuted each and every one of the allegations. If Mr. Cline tried to include
all the documents for each and every one of the trials and or hearings, this
9

Jensen v. Sew 134 P.2d 1081
In re Kelly Federal Reporter, Volume 46, PP. 653

10

20

bi ief would be ovei 400 pages long. ' 1 1 lis is ridicules and no one should
hav e to be si lbjected to tl lis She 1: lad i nade tl le allegatioi I o^ • ei ai id oi(. 'ei
again that Mr. Cline is Harassing her. Although the statute defines
harassment, UCA 76-5-106 states that harassment has to include "violent
felony" and Mr. Cline denies in any way that he has threatened a violent
felony against her. By her own definition, she is harassing Mr, Cline with
her i epeated acquisitions. Coi ii: t si 101 ild take a strong stand against this type
of bel i.a;v ioi ai id disi i liss tl lis pi otective ordei oi i those gi oui ids aloi le
There is the issue of Discrimination and failing to grant Mr. Cline
equal protection under the laws as required by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Article VI of the Constitution of the United States states in part that "This
Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof,,

Shall hi Illii supreme law of the land: and the

Judges in every State shall be bound thereby "" \ll courts now kivi ,i ii
legal obligation to not see color or race or handicap or even gender when
decisions are made. In spite of that a women can get a protective order in
Utah just because her husband yells at her. Yet Mr. Cline has tried several
times un-successfully to get a protective order for his children and him when
Ji llies coi idi ict v 'as ii I cleai a Dlatioi I of State Code 1 1 lis is cleat ly
disci iminatoi } ' I i y arguii ig discrii i lii lation agaii ist tl le \ ery In ldge tl: lat is

21

discriminating against you. Mr. Cline filed a motion for Recrusal of Judge
Hilder, based upon the concept of discrimination and it was denied by the
court. Yet it is obvious that it goes on. The United States Supreme Court
concluded, "To withstand scrutiny" under the Equal Protection Clause,
Classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."11 Court
should dismiss this protective order on the basis of discrimination alone.
In addition specific rights to see his children were taken away as a
result of this protective order. Given that there were no specific allegations
that Mr. Cline had done anything against the children, Trial Court has no
right to take away rights to see the children even if there turn's out to be
some legitimate state interest in protecting the mother. The United States
Supreme Court has ruled that "The extent to which procedural due process
must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may
be condemned to suffer grievous loss.'... and depends upon whether the
recipients interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governments interest
in summary adjudication."

There may be legitimate times when a person

needs protection from an abusive spouse, but in this case every single issue
except for the incident in which Mr. Cline called Julie and asked if she was
11
12

Orr v. Orr 440 U.S. 268
Goldberg v. Kelly 379 U.S. 254 (1979)
22

afraid he was going to beat her up, had already been heai
In September 22,.

judge Hi I dor.

contempt hearing amotion w .r miule Ii« lnlie loi i

new protcctis i.1 order JUJ \\:r denied hv Judj'e I I'Uei

Win then does Court

need lo lake siiiniflainl rights away from Mr. Cline on an Ex Party order.
And why did Court need to modify visitation with the children at all. The
United States Supreme Court ruled "the fundamental liberty interest of
natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child is
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and does no I cvapoi alt
simply because the^

lost
<*hild to the state. A parental rights

termination proceeding interferes with that fundamental liberty
interest. When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it
• ->

must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures."
Due Process rights have been violated when Attorney Steve Wall is
allowed to continue lo iepiesei11 lnlio m ihp, or 'iiv other east" involving
Appellant

\\ ith the ver\ llrsl document filed in the divorce case, Appellant

requested the dismissal of Steve Wall. Due to ineffective assistance of
counsel, Mr. Clines then attorney, for some reason failed to properly finish
having Steve dismissed. At a later hearing when Mi l line was then

13

Stantosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745
ii.

defending himself Pro Se, he brought up again the issue of dismissal of
Steve. Court encouraged Mr. Cline to file a formal motion requesting such.
Shortly thereafter, Mr. Cline filed the formal motion and a hearing was held.
One of the reasons it was denied was because of the short length of time till
the trial was finished. But the Court made several errors in not dismissing
Steve. One of them was that Court concluded that contact was made and
information was shared, but that it didn't constitute an attorney client
relationship. Numerous Federal Court of Appeals decisions have ruled that
an Attorney Client Relationship occurs automatically any time one party
shares information with the Attorney in which he believes that the Attorney
is acting as his Attorney.14 Mr. Cline also argues that Court errored in that
it used a high standard of proof on the part of Mr. Cline for having Steve
dismissed. Federal Appellate Courts have ruled that the standard for an
Attorney when refuting evidence of Conflict of Interest is Clear and
Convincing Evidence on the part of the Attorney. It also states that Court
should resolve any doubt with an order of disqualification.15 Even if court
had reason in the divorce case to allow Steve to continue to represent Julie
because of the length of time left till trial, Court could have very easily

14

Poly Software v. Yu Su, 880F. Supp 1847
Nelson v. Green Builder Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1493
15
LaSalle Nat'l Bank 703 F.2d 257
O/l

dismissed Steve from this case. Mr. Cline again argues that this alone
should be enough to get the protective order dismissed.
Finally Appellant argues 111; 11 (Ins pioh eli\ e ohlei ^hutiU Ivr dismissed
because it JUSI phiie e-jiui mvded .iml ,Inline has not provided any evidence of
;ii»\ issues (Iiit w nuld allow a protective order to issue as dictated by statute.
Court concluded that just a shout at your spouse could be the basis for a
protective order issuance. No basis for that opinion can be found in any
state statute. Utah Code defines abuse as ""Abuse" means intentionally or
knowingly causing or attempting to can* .
intentional
physica' • •

.

*

*.< ;
'

^

nable fear of Imminent

a concluded that "Statutory enactment are

to he construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful".17
"Court is compelled to give statutorily language meaning, and to assume that
each and every term in statute was used advisedly unless such a reading is
unreasonably confused or inoperable."18 "Courl will ..noid inlerprchilioii
which renders portion ol ,»i eoid\ nt itaiuiles

SU|HTI1IH)US

or inoperative.

Excepi Ioi i lie :1111"gatiori that Mr. Cline grabbed her and shook her in the
fiout yard, which was already ruled upon by Judge Hilder and found to be
16

UCA 30-6-1(1)
Platts v. Parents Helping Parents 947 P.2d. 658
18
IBID
19
IBID
7

without merit, there was no allegation of causing cohabitant physical harm.
The question then is whether a phone call from Mr. Cline in which he stated,
" what are you afraid I am going to come and beat you up?, well I am not",
would put a reasonable person in "fear of imminent physical harm?" Even if
the statement was taken without the second part, the statement was a
question, not a threat to do something. It is also not done "intentionally to
cause fear". Even if she was afraid after the phone call, was there anything
about the statement that suggested that "imminent" physical danger was
present? Mr. Cline was over ten miles away and so nothing about that
would display imminent danger.
Utah Code defines domestic violence as the same as UCA 77-36-1.
The second paragraph of UCA 77-36-1 defines domestic violence as any
"criminal" offence. It also describes a number of other crimes that could be
construed to be Domestic Violence. Assault is listed there. UCA 76-5-102
describes assault as "a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or
violence,". Again even if the incidents she has outlined were considered
threats, which they were not, it must be followed by "immediate" show of
force. Since Mr. Cline was ten miles away, it would be very difficult to
establish the requirement that it be immediate. Harassment as defined by
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UCA 76-5-106 does not fit in any of the allegations that she has made.
Stalking as defined by UCA 76-5-106.5 Also does not fit into the legal
definition of what she has described. In short, Julie has made a whole bunch
of accusations that don't come close to meeting the definition of abuse or
domestic violence as required by statute.
For all these reasons the Protective Order should be dismissed.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Mr. Cline has shown several reasons for the protective
order to have been dismissed. Each and every one of the reasons standing
alone should be enough for the court to dismiss it. When you look at it in
light of all the inaccuracies and puffing, the intentional leaving out other
court issues so that she could get the protective order submitted the way it
was, it is clear that this order has no business being issued. It should be
overturned and dismissed. In addition Court should issue an order that Steve
Wall should dismiss himself from representing any issue between Julie and
Mr. Cline because of an conflict of interest.

S

Respectfully Submitted this f -^Day of June, 2004

Appellant (Pro Se)

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document was hand delivered this,/
Steve Wall
Wall and Wall
4460 S Highland Dr. Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84124

day of June, 2004 to:

Exhibits
78-7-19. Repeated application for orders forbidden.
(1) If an application for an order, made to a judge of a court in which the action or
proceeding is pending, is refused in whole or in part or is granted conditionally, a
subsequent application for the same order may not be made to any other judge, except of
a higher court.
(2) This section does not apply to motions refused for any informality in the papers or
proceedings necessary to obtain the order, or to motions refused with liberty to renew
them.
(3) A notice of appeal for a trial de novo is not a subsequent application for the same
order.
30-6-1. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Abuse" means intentionally or knowingly causing or attempting to cause a
cohabitant physical harm or intentionally or knowingly placing a cohabitant in reasonable
fear of imminent physical harm.
(2) "Cohabitant" means an emancipated person pursuant to Section 15-2-1 or a person
who is 16 years of age or older who:
(a) is or was a spouse of the other party;
(b) is or was living as if a spouse of the other party;
(c) is related by blood or marriage to the other party;
(d) has one or more children in common with the other party;
(e) is the biological parent of the other party's unborn child; or
(f) resides or has resided in the same residence as the other party.
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), "cohabitant" does not include:
(a) the relationship of natural parent, adoptive parent, or step-parent to a minor; or
(b) the relationship between natural, adoptive, step, or foster siblings who are under 18
years of age.
(4) "Court clerk" means a district court clerk.
(5) "Domestic violence" means the same as that term is defined in Section 77-36-1.
(6) "Ex parte protective order" means an order issued without notice to the defendant
in accordance with this chapter.
(7) "Foreign protective order" means a protective order issued by another state,
territory, or possession of the United States, tribal lands of the United States, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or the District of Columbia which shall be given full
faith and credit in Utah, if the protective order is similar to a protective order issued in
compliance with Title 30, Chapter 6, Cohabitant Abuse Act, or Title 77, Chapter 36,
Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act, and includes the following requirements:
(a) the requirements of due process were met by the issuing court, including subject
matter and personal jurisdiction;
(b) the respondent received reasonable notice; and
(c) the respondent had an opportunity for a hearing regarding the protective order.
(8) "Law enforcement unit" or "law enforcement agency" means any public agency
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having general police power and charged with making arrests in connection with
enforcement of the criminal statutes and ordinances of this state or any political
subdivision.
(9) "Peace officer" means those persons specified in Title 53, Chapter 13, Peace
Officer Classifications.
(10) "Protective order" means an order issued pursuant to this chapter subsequent to a
hearing on the petition, of which the petitioner and respondent have been given notice in
accordance with this chapter.
30-6-4. Forms for petitions and protective orders — Assistance.
(1) (a) The offices of the court clerk shall provide forms and nonlegal assistance to
persons seeking to proceed under this chapter.
(b) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall develop and adopt uniform forms for
petitions and orders for protection in accordance with the provisions of this chapter on or
before September 1, 1995. That office shall provide the forms to the clerk of each court
authorized to issue protective orders. The forms shall include:
(i) a statement notifying the petitioner for an ex parte protective order that knowing
falsification of any statement or information provided for the purpose of obtaining a
protective order may subject the petitioner to felony prosecution;
(ii) a separate portion of the form for those provisions, the violation of which is a
criminal offense, and a separate portion for those provisions, the violation of which is a
civil violation, as provided in Subsection 30-6-4.2(5);
(iii) language in the criminal provision portion stating violation of any criminal
provision is a class A misdemeanor, and language in the civil portion stating violation of
or failure to comply with a civil provision is subject to contempt proceedings;
(iv) a space for information the petitioner is able to provide to facilitate identification
of the respondent, such as social security number, driver license number, date of birth,
address, telephone number, and physical description;
(v) a space for the petitioner to request a specific period of time for the civil
provisions to be in effect, not to exceed 150 days, unless the petitioner provides in
writing the reason for the requested extension of the length of time beyond 150 days;
(vi) a statement advising the petitioner that when a minor child is included in an ex
parte protective order or a protective order, as part of either the criminal or the civil
portion of the order, the petitioner may provide a copy of the order to the principal of the
school where the child attends; and
(vii) a statement advising the petitioner that if the respondent fails to return custody of
a minor child to the petitioner as ordered in a protective order, the petitioner may obtain
from the court a writ of assistance.
(2) If the person seeking to proceed under this chapter is not represented by an
attorney, it is the responsibility of the court clerk's office to provide:
(a) the forms adopted pursuant to Subsection (1);
(b) all other forms required to petition for an order for protection including, but not
limited to, forms for service;
(c) clerical assistance in filling out the forms and filing the petition, in accordance
with Subsection (l)(a). A court clerk's office may designate any other entity, agency, or
person to provide that service, but the court clerk's office is responsible to see that the
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service is provided;
(d) information regarding the means available for the service of process;
(e) a list of legal service organizations that may represent the petitioner in an action
brought under this chapter, together with the telephone numbers of those organizations;
and
(f) written information regarding the procedure for transporting a jailed or imprisoned
respondent to the protective order hearing, including an explanation of the use of
transportation order forms when necessary.
(3) No charges may be imposed by a court clerk, constable, or law enforcement
agency for:
(a) filing a petition under this chapter;
(b) obtaining an ex parte protective order;
(c) obtaining copies, either certified or not certified, necessary for service or delivery
to law enforcement officials; or
(d) fees for service of a petition, ex parte protective order, or protective order.
(4) A petition for an order of protection shall be in writing and verified.
(5) (a) All orders for protection shall be issued in the form adopted by the
Administrative Office of the Courts pursuant to Subsection (1).
(b) Each protective order issued, except orders issued ex parte, shall include the
following language:
"Respondent was afforded both notice and opportunity to be heard in the hearing that
gave rise to this order. Pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, P.L. 103322, 108 Stat. 1796, 18 U.S.C.A. 2265, this order is valid in all the United States, the
District of Columbia, tribal lands, and United States territories."
(Emphasis added)
30-6-4.1. Continuing duty to inform court of other proceedings — Effect of other
proceedings.
(1) At any hearing in a proceeding to obtain an order for protection, each party has a
continuing duty to inform the court of each proceeding for an order for protection, any
civil litigation, each proceeding in juvenile court, and each criminal case involving either
party, including the case name, the file number, and the county and state of the
proceeding, if that information is known by the party.
(2) (a) An order for protection issued pursuant to this chapter is in addition to and not
in lieu of any other available civil or criminal proceeding.
(b) A petitioner is not barred from seeking a protective order because of other pending
proceedings.
(c) A court may not delay granting relief under this chapter because of the existence of
a pending civil action between the parties.
(3) A petitioner may omit his or her address from all documents filed with the court
under this chapter, but shall separately provide the court with a mailing address that is not
to be made part of the public record, but that may be provided to a peace officer or entity
for service of process.
30-6-15. Dismissal of protective order when divorce is final.
When a protective order exists and a divorce proceeding is pending between the same
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parties named in the protective order, the protective order shall be dismissed when the
court issues a decree of divorce for the parties if the petitioner in the protective order
action is present or has been given notice in both the divorce and protective order action
of the hearing, and the court specifically finds that the order need not continue. If the
court dismisses the protective order, the court shall immediately issue an order of
dismissal to be filed in the protective order action and transmit a copy of the order of
dismissal to the statewide domestic violence network as described in Section 30-6-8.
30-6-4.3. Hearings on ex parte orders.
(1) (a) When a court issues an ex parte protective order the court shall set a date for a
hearing on the petition within 20 days after the ex parte order is issued.
(b) If at that hearing the court does not issue a protective order, the ex parte protective
order shall expire, unless it is otherwise extended by the court.
(c) If at that hearing the court issues a protective order, the ex parte protective order
remains in effect until service of process of the protective order is completed.
(d) A protective order issued after notice and a hearing is effective until further order
of the court.
(e) If the hearing on the petition is heard by a commissioner, either the petitioner or
respondent may file an objection within ten days of the entry of the recommended order
and the assigned judge shall hold a hearing within 20 days of the filing of the objection.
(2) Upon a hearing under this section, the court may grant any of the relief described
in Section 30-6-4.2.
(3) When a court denies a petition for an ex parte protective order or a petition to
modify an order for protection ex parte, the court shall set the matter for hearing upon
notice to the respondent.
(4) A respondent who has been served with an ex parte protective order may seek to
vacate the ex parte protective order prior to the hearing scheduled pursuant to Subsection
(l)(a) by filing a verified motion to vacate. The respondent's verified motion to vacate
and a notice of hearing on that motion shall be personally served on the petitioner at least
two days prior to the hearing on the motion to vacate.
77-36-1. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Cohabitant" has the same meaning as in Section 30-6-1.
(2) "Domestic violence" means any criminal offense involving violence or physical
harm or threat of violence or physical harm, or any attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to
commit a criminal offense involving violence or physical harm, when committed by one
cohabitant against another. "Domestic violence" also means commission or attempt to
commit, any of the following offenses by one cohabitant against another:
(a) aggravated assault, as described in Section 76-5-103;
(b) assault, as described in Section 76-5-102;
(c) criminal homicide, as described in Section 76-5-201;
(d) harassment, as described in Section 76-5-106;
(e) telephone harassment, as described in Section 76-9-201;
(f) kidnaping, child kidnaping, or aggravated kidnaping, as described in Sections 76-5301, 76-5-301.1, and 76-5-302;
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(g) mayhem, as described in Section 76-5-105;
(h) sexual offenses, as described in Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, and Title 76, Chapter
5a;
(i) stalking, as described in Section 76-5-106.5;
(j) unlawful detention, as described in Section 76-5-304;
(k) violation of a protective order or ex parte protective order, as described in Section
76-5-108;
(1) any offense against property described in Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 1, 2, or 3;
(m) possession of a deadly weapon with intent to assault, as described in Section 7610-507;
(n) discharge of a firearm from a vehicle, near a highway, or in the direction of any
person, building, or vehicle, as described in Section 76-10-508;
(0) disorderly conduct, as defined in Section 76-9-102, if a conviction of disorderly
conduct is the result of a plea agreement in which the defendant was originally charged
with any of the domestic violence offenses otherwise described in this Subsection (2).
Conviction of disorderly conduct as a domestic violence offense, in the manner described
in this Subsection (2)(o), does not constitute a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence
under 18 U.S.C. Section 921, and is exempt from the provisions of the federal Firearms
Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 921 et seq.; or
(p) child abuse as described in Section 76-5-109.1.
(3) "Victim" means a cohabitant who has been subjected to domestic violence.
76-5-109. Child abuse.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Child" means a human being who is under 18 years of age.
(b) "Child abuse" means any offense described in Subsection (2) or (3), or in Section
76-5-109.1.
(c) "Physical injury" means an injury to or condition of a child which impairs the
physical condition of the child, including:
(i) a bruise or other contusion of the skin;
(ii) a minor laceration or abrasion;
(iii) failure to thrive or malnutrition; or
(iv) any other condition which imperils the child's health or welfare and which is not a
serious physical injury as defined in Subsection (l)(d).
(d) "Serious physical injury" means any physical injury or set of injuries which
seriously impairs the child's health, or which involves physical torture or causes serious
emotional harm to the child, or which involves a substantial risk of death to the child,
including:
(i) fracture of any bone or bones;
(ii) intracranial bleeding, swelling or contusion of the brain, whether caused by blows,
shaking, or causing the child's head to impact with an object or surface;
(iii) any burn, including burns inflicted by hot water, or those caused by placing a hot
object upon the skin or body of the child;
(iv) any injury caused by use of a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601;
(v) any combination of two or more physical injuries inflicted by the same person,
either at the same time or on different occasions;
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(vi) any damage to internal organs of the body;
(vii) any conduct toward a child which results in severe emotional harm, severe
developmental delay or retardation, or severe impairment of the child's ability to
function;
(viii) any injury which creates a permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or
impairment of the function of a bodily member, limb, or organ;
(ix) any conduct which causes a child to cease breathing, even if resuscitation is
successful following the conduct; or
(x) any conduct which results in starvation or failure to thrive or malnutrition that
jeopardizes the child's life.
(2) Any person who inflicts upon a child serious physical injury or, having the care or
custody of such child, causes or permits another to inflict serious physical injury upon a
child is guilty of an offense as follows:
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a felony of the second degree;
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a felony of the third degree; or
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class A misdemeanor.
(3) Any person who inflicts upon a child physical injury or, having the care or custody
of such child, causes or permits another to inflict physical injury upon a child is guilty of
an offense as follows:
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a class A misdemeanor;
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a class B misdemeanor; or
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class C misdemeanor.
(4) A parent or legal guardian who provides a child with treatment by spiritual means
alone through prayer, in lieu of medical treatment, in accordance with the tenets and
practices of an established church or religious denomination of which the parent or legal
guardian is a member or adherent shall not, for that reason alone, be deemed to have
committed an offense under this section.
76-5-102. Assault.
(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily
injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to
another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if:
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy.
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily injury to
another.
76-5-106. Harassment.
(1) A person is guilty of harassment if, with intent to frighten or harass another, he
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communicates a written or recorded threat to commit any violent felony.
(2) Harassment is a class B misdemeanor.
76-5-106.5. Definitions — Stalking — Injunction — Hearing.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical proximity
to a person or repeatedly conveying verbal or written threats or threats implied by
conduct or a combination thereof directed at or toward a person.
(b) "Immediate family" means a spouse, parent, child, sibling, or any other person
who regularly resides in the household or who regularly resided in the household within
the prior six months.
(c) "Repeatedly" means on two or more occasions.
(2) A person is guilty of stalking who:
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific
person that would cause a reasonable person:
(i) to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of his immediate family; or
(ii) to suffer emotional distress to himself or a member of his immediate family;
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the specific person:
(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury to himself or a member of his
immediate family; or
(ii) will suffer emotional distress or a member of his immediate family will suffer
emotional distress; and
(c) whose conduct:
(i) induces fear in the specific person of bodily injury to himself or a member of his
immediate family; or
(ii) causes emotional distress in the specific person or a member of his immediate
family.
(3) A person is also guilty of stalking who intentionally or knowingly violates a
stalking injunction issued pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 3a, Stalking Injunctions, or
intentionally or knowingly violates a permanent criminal stalking injunction issued
pursuant to this section.
(4) Stalking is a class A misdemeanor:
(a) upon the offender's first violation of Subsection (2); or
(b) if the offender violated a stalking injunction issued pursuant to Title 77, Chapter
3a, Stalking Injunctions.
(5) Stalking is a third degree felony if the offender:
(a) has been previously convicted of an offense of stalking;
(b) has been convicted in another jurisdiction of an offense that is substantially similar
to the offense of stalking;
(c) has been previously convicted of any felony offense in Utah or of any crime in
another jurisdiction which if committed in Utah would be a felony, in which the victim of
the stalking or a member of the victim's immediate family was also a victim of the
previous felony offense; or
(d) violated a permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant to Subsection
(7).
(6) Stalking is a felony of the second degree if the offender:

(a) used a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or used other means or
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury, in the commission of the crime of
stalking;
(b) has been previously convicted two or more times of the offense of stalking;
(c) has been convicted two or more times in another jurisdiction or jurisdictions of
offenses that are substantially similar to the offense of stalking;
(d) has been convicted two or more times, in any combination, of offenses under
Subsection (5); or
(e) has been previously convicted two or more times of felony offenses in Utah or of
crimes in another jurisdiction or jurisdictions which, if committed in Utah, would be
felonies, in which the victim of the stalking was also a victim of the previous felony
offenses.
(7) A conviction for stalking or a plea accepted by the court and held in abeyance for a
period of time shall operate as an application for a permanent criminal stalking injunction
limiting the contact of the defendant and the victim.
(a) A permanent criminal stalking injunction shall be issued without a hearing unless
the defendant requests a hearing at the time of the verdict, finding, or plea of guilty,
guilty and mentally ill, plea of no contest, or acceptance of plea in abeyance. The court
shall give the defendant notice of his right to request a hearing.
(i) If the defendant requests a hearing, it shall be held at the time of the verdict,
finding, or plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, plea of no contest, or acceptance of plea
in abeyance unless the victim requests otherwise, or for good cause.
(ii) If the verdict, finding, or plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, plea of no contest,
or acceptance of plea in abeyance was entered in a justice court, a certified copy of the
judgment and conviction or a certified copy of the court's order holding the plea in
abeyance must be filed by the victim in the district court as an application and request for
hearing for a permanent criminal stalking injunction.
(b) A permanent criminal stalking injunction may grant the following relief:
(i) an order restraining the defendant from entering the residence, property, school, or
place of employment of the victim and requiring the defendant to stay away from the
victim and members of the victim's immediate family or household and to stay away
from any specified place that is named in the order and is frequented regularly by the
victim; and
(ii) an order restraining the defendant from making contact with the victim, including
an order forbidding the defendant from personally or through an agent initiating any
communication likely to cause annoyance or alarm, including personal, written, or
telephone contact with the victim, the victim's employers, employees, fellow workers, or
others with whom communication would be likely to cause annoyance or alarm to the
victim.
(c) A permanent criminal stalking injunction may be dissolved upon application of the
victim to the court which granted the order.
(d) Notice of permanent criminal stalking injunctions issued pursuant to this section
shall be sent by the court to the statewide warrants network or similar system.
(e) A permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant to this section shall be
effective statewide.
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(f) Violation of an injunction issued pursuant to this section shall constitute an offense
of stalking. Violations may be enforced in a civil action initiated by the stalking victim, a
criminal action initiated by a prosecuting attorney, or both.
(g) Nothing in this section shall preclude thefilingof a criminal information for
stalking based on the same act which is the basis for the violation of the stalking
injunction issued pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 3a, Stalking Injunctions, or permanent
criminal stalking injunction.
U.S. Constitution: Fifth Amendment
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.
U.S. Constitution: Fourteenth Amendment
Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or properly, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
Section. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in
each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the
United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers
of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the
male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of
the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion,
or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the
proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole
number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Section. 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or
elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military,
under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a
member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any
State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the
enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House,
remove such disability.
Section. 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services
in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred
in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the
loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims
shall be held illegal and void.
Section. 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
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P R O C E E D I N G S
(Electronically recorded on December 12, 2003)
THE COURT: Primarily, Mr. Cline, I understand that
you have family who have brought you some documents and have
real issues about you getting you those documents, and that is
a significant security concern.
A few years ago it would have been a non-issue.
Unfortunately it's become an issue because in these wonderful
modern times we've learned that security is just going to
rise in ways that we cannot conceive with the naked eye, for
example, such as powders or even Anthrax.

It's a true issue,

and one I cannot ignore.
But let's talk about the scope of what we're doing
today.

My understanding is, number one, we address the status

of the ex parte protective order today, which should continue
in force.

That one ended a couple of weeks ago, and today is

zhe rearing set to determine if a permanent or relatively
permanent order should enter or whether it should be dismissed
On that issue, Mr. Cline, there are particular
documents you were seeking.

A lot of this is stuff that has

been addressed to the Court in many different ways, but in
terms of the documents you're trying to get together, how did
that impact the protective order portion?
MR. CLINE: There's several reasons, your Honor.

Her

motion for protective order was made based upon the fact that
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she deserved the protective order previously, and she's asking
to have

it reinstated.
THE COURT: Well, it —

that's not the way.

I know it seems like that, but

You can apply for one any tine, and I

guess you can call it reinstatement.

I think that really is

just a question of words, but I reviewed it.

I'm the one that

granted it, and it wasn't based on reinstating.

It was whether

she's making sufficient aliegations of cohabitant abuse or
violence that would support a protective order, as I look at
it.

So, I mean it wasn't so much a reinstatement, as does she

make out a case now?
MR. CLINE: Your Honor, the principles of res judicata
say that you can't be charged over and over and over again, and
the documents that I have are in protective order from Karen 1
as subsequent protective order from -THE COURT: I guess it was your brother.
get —

I've got every file,

He managed to

I know what you mean.

gone through every one of those last night.

So I have

I have with this

new one five protective order files.
MR. CLINE: Okay, there's two of them that I filed.
THE COURT: Yes, two that she filed.
MR. CLINE: Two of them are that she filed.
THE COURT: Three, "really, I guess, now.
MR. CLINE: Yes.
THE COURT: Yes, that's correct.

I looked at every one
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of them.
KR, CLINE: So based on the principles of res ^udicta,
I still need to get those documents,
THE COURT: Res judicata, and it doesn't necessarily
work that way*

Res judicata is a very interesting doctrine,

but it means an issue conclusively decided on the merits.
binding on future proceedings.

A lot of fact.

It's

Itfs not like

double jeopardy, that's very different although it's got some
of the same basic underpinnings of fairness.
Res judicata is more a judicial economy doctrine in
this state.

We don't decide the same issues over and over, but

most of these were never granted.

So they were not of issue.

The ex parte (inaudible) granted, or they were dissolved or
they were dissolved by agreement.
Theyr in my opinion, do not bar filing one, particular
if Ms, Camp can make out any more recent occurrence.

I think

that's the issue on this and some of it was from a long hearing
where we looked at issues of contempt which frankly (inaudible)
you being in this position, and some was about stuff that
happened in the last ccupie months, if I remerrber correctly,
although Ms. Camp did rehash a lot of old stuff, no question.
MR. CLINE: She has a lot of what?
THE COURT: She rehashed a lot of old stuff, but it
will be a couple of new things, and we really can't —
got to look for that new stuff very carefully.

we've

-5
MR. CLINE: Well, I —

the point is I feel like I neec

-- I need those documents in order to prepare my defense.

I

don't even feel like the actual protective order was filled out
properly because I filled out two of these, your Honor, and in
each and every case they ask you to specifically list any
pending cases, and she should have listed the juvenile court
case with Robert,

She should have listed the divorce case.

She should have listed those two projective orders that sr.e' s
previously filed, because they go and they pull those and they
-ell you specifically that you cannot add old stuff to a new
protective order, and she didn't even list those on there.
THE COURT: Well, the issue today really probably is
mostly whether there are new things that would support issuance
of che order, and that burden is hers to meet.
MR. CLINE: So we can throw out all the old stuff?
"HE COURT: Not necessarily.

It depends on how it

was thrown out or resolved, but my primary focus is on you,
definitely.
on the —

Sr. I think —

Mr. Wall, what is your position

did you come prepared today to carry the burden of

showing why a permanent order should enter?
MR. WALL: Certainly, your Honor.
THE COURT: That would be number one we're doing.
]ust (inaudible) that we're doing otherwise.

It's

I also set this

as a review of the custody status, whether you should se^ve the
full 30 days or whether you should be released sooner.

Did you

come prepared to address that?
MR. CLINE: Yes.

I didn't realize that wc were goir.g

to review the custody status, but I have a motion I filed that:
was going to be heard today over with Commissioner Evans.
Commissioner Evans?

Yeah, it's Commissioner Evans, and when

we were here at the —
THE COURT: In the divorce?
MR. CLINE: Yes,
THE COURT: I didn't see it.

What's that about?

MR. CLINE: What?
THE COURT: What's that for?
MR. CLINZ: That's what the order that's a —

Steve's.

Steve's got an order sent tc my Mom and Dad and tney turned
around and sent 1: to me in jail.

There is a motion in there

about changing temporary orders, and that's what we were set t
be -- to be here about, your Honor*
THE COURT: Weil, I he»ve —

you have your motion to

modify, but that's a trial issue, isn't it?
MR. WALL: Well, your Honor, we —
and che order has been submitted to you.

the Court ordered
I don't know whether

the appropriate time has elapsed to sign that iron the last
hearing, and that was that ail matters be consolidated -THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. WALL: —

and heard by you.

THE COURT: And that's the way it's going to be, but I

haven't seen the order on that.
MR. WALL: Well, I delivered -- hand delivered ic
myself, [inaudible) I think it's in your basket.

He said we'd

hold it ten days, but I can't remember.
THE COURT: Yeah, we have it three days mailing ana
then the time and then we put (inaudible) and the weekends
generally get us.

So we're normally looking about 11 or 12

cays by the cime we're done.
MR. WALL: Well, in any event, that order is wiih the
Court and ic -- it. consolidated ail matters, and Mr. cline has
this motion to modify temporary orders,

I filed a response to

that.
MR. CLINE: Which I haven't seen, your Honor.
MR. WALL: The reason Mr. Cline hasn't received

—

THE COURT: I have seen your response, yes.
MR. WALL: Okay, and I've got his copy here.

The rule

entitle us to deliver up to one day before the hearing.
jail will net accept the facts.

The

They will not -- zhe only way

Z can deliver this (inaudible) is to personally deliver it
myself, and then I have to remain there while he reads it.
guess I can'z leave it with him.

I

So that wasn't an acceptable

arrangement,
So I've got that response today to his motion, but
ne's got that pending and I assumed we would be hearing that
totiav.

If not then I guess we could certainly move that over
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for another day, but that would have in fact eliminate the need
to appear before Commissioner Evans, which was scheduled for
today,
THE COURT: Well, I scheduled him for today.

There was

one en the 10" en the protective order, but that was stricken.
I noted last night that although we struck it, it only showed
up ir. the divorce case.

So he didn't know that.

He just

struck for nonappearance saying his facts, but I did a minute
entry explaining that he'd had in his facts (inaudible) today.
So that needs to be clarified in that file, but —
the most —

now

the temporary order, sir, this case has become such

a convoluted mess that it makes no sense for a Commissioner tc
be making recommendations on a piecemeal basis that are all
subject to review by me.

So, they're going tc be heard here.

MR. CLINE: And I agree with that, your Honor.

I think

that's fine.
THE COURT: And recognizing the high (inaudible) of
this divorce and all the other issues, I will continue to do
everything in my power to allow expedited hearings, but you
have not seen the response to your motion for temporary
orders

—
MR. CLINE: No, sir.
THE COURT: I think depending or. how we determine your

custody status today, we probably should look at rescheduling
that in the very near future, once you've had a chance to

-9review it ar.d get the paper work that you haven't had a cnance
to get to.
MR. CLINEr One of the issues there is about addressing
the disqualification of Mr. Wall. That's in that motion —
THE COURT: Well, that should be a separate motion.

If

you've got a basis to move for that, it's got to be separate.
MR, WALL: Well, I certainly wouldn't mind addressing
that today, your Honor, because they keep having that addressed
and I'n addressing

—

THE CC'JRT: I'm willing to address — I say T got. your
response and I (inaudible), because I just saw it last night
for

the first: ^;mef in fact, also.

In fact, it was received

yesterday, it looks like.
I did notice in your affidavit a response to that
issue, and disqualification of opposing Counsel is a difficult
thing because people are entitled to Counsel of their choice,
you've got a fairly high burden.

So I guess I'll ask you if

you feel ready to address this today without more paperwork?
MR. CLI.\'E: Well, your Honor, all the paperwork

zhat

have, and the evidence I have is in that mo tier, that ] !iied ar.ri
I don't have a copy of it with me.
THE COURT: As to the one that's in the file, if I
could find that we could make- you a copygive you.

What we have, we can

That's not a problem, but that's all we would 'nave,

but I'm not sure which one it is.

What date did you file it;

-10do you recall?

There's a lot of paper in here and I'm not sure

which one -MR. WALL: (Inaudible) his motion to modify temporary
orders.
MR. CLINE: It was in September

—

THE CC'JRT: Yeah, (inaudible).
MR. WALL: ; Inaudible; all of them.
MR. CLINE: (Inaudible),
KR. WALL: November 4*h is when the motion (inaudible).
THE; COURT: (Inaudible).
MR, WALL: And then he's got a memorandum attached with
it, and I think it's paragraph 7 where he addresses -THE COURT: The disqualification issue goes to some
allegation that in some way you represented or counseled both
a:: one tine.
MR, WALL: Well, Chat's his allegation.
THE COURT: I know.

Irm asking about the allegations.

I'm not asking you to admit or deny at this point.
position, because that's what it's about.
what I notice.

I know your

It doesn't -- that's

So there's nothing else in there on that issue

of disqualification?
MR. CLINE: Yes, there is, your Honor.

It has to do

with not only did he counsel with me, but that he subsequently
turned around and released all the information chat I had giver;
to him tc my ex-mother-in-law, who subsequently then released

-lil t again to ray wifer at the time.
THE COURT: Well and what you're saying, then, is that
he had an attorney/cl ien: relationship with you -MR. CLINE: And that he released that information.
THE COURT: Uh-huh, yes.

So, it sounds like it's

evidentiary, to tell you the truthr as much as I hate to say
so.

I think 1 told you we only had about an hour this morning,

and I don't know how I determine that.

I have your statement.

I have Mr. Wail's affidavit that says basically don't know.
didn't have that relationship with Mr. Cline.

I

I have a -- I

den' t knew how to decide that sort of evidence from both of
you .
MR. CLINE: Sc, it

would continue that, then, now?

THE COURT: I think we have to.
MR. CLINE: That's fine.
THE COURT: Okay,
to address today?

That's fine now.

Otherwise, what did you understand

Every time we meet it's in. the nature of

review, but there are limited things that could have occurred
in the almost three weeks Mr. Cline has been in jail.
Are there issues that have arisen during this time -this is for Mr. Wall or Ms. Blomquist -- that ycu wish to
address today.
ne^d

Why don't we talk about what else we might

to address or should address before we make determination

on the protective order and custody.
(Conclusion of Mr. Cline's testimony.)
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on December 12, 2003)

3

(Pro se arguments of Mr. Earl Cline)

4

THE COURT:

Mr, Cline, respond please, sir, anyway you

MR, CLINE:

Your Honor, can I request that you release

5

wish.

6
7

just one of these?

8
9

THE COURT:

You are able to do that to take notes.

MR. CLINE:

And then I need a pen or a pencil or

That

is fine.

10

11 I something,
12 j

THE COURT:

13

UNIDENTIFIED:

14

THE COURT:

Thank you.

15

MR. CLINE:

I have a number of things, your Honor, and

17

THE COURT:

On the protective order?

18

MR. CLINE:

On the protective order only.

19

THE COURT:

Okay.

20

MR. CLINE:

All right.

16

Bryan, do you have an extra?
I have one, your Honor,

then—

Okay.

That onefs done.

A couple of things, your Honor.

That oners

21

done.

Number one -- and

22

because I didn't have a chance to check the law library, I looked

23

at this a few months ago.

24

order laws, okay.

25

have to be done through juvenile court.

The State of Utah redid the protective

All protective orders that involve children
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THE COURT:

2 j children.

Nor if they're only for the protection of

There's a distinction.

It's a very important one.

3

it's a protective order for the protection of children, m

4

of minor children, then they go to the juvenile court.

5

they —

If

behalf

If

protective orders involving adults that have an impact on

6 I children go to district court.
7
8

MR. CLINE:

And I —

like I said, I didn't get the

chance to go back and read the statute, okay, and so that may be

9 I correct.
10

THE COURT:

I can assure you it's correct.

11

MR. CLINE:

Okay.

12

THE COURT:

It was a very hotly debated issue, and I'm

13

a member of the state judicial council.

We're the ones who make

14

the determination whether we back or not this kind of

15

legislation.

16

interestingly, what has happened by transferring the children

17

ones to the juvenile court is the numbers have exploded because

This was hotly debated for about a year.

And

18 I parents are using the children as pawns and they're going to the
19

juvenile court to try and get an advantage in divorces, and so

20

now we're reconsidering —

considering running new legislation to

21

get rid of that loophole.

But I can assure you the distinction

22

is very real.

23

This is a district court protective order*

24
25

This is a protective order between two adults.

MR. CLINE:
children.

Yeah, but she also has included the

~5~
1
2

THE COURT:
children.

Yes, but they almost always include

What we moved from the district court were cases where

3 I you do not include the adults.
4

MR. CLINE:

And that's fine,

5

THE COURT:

That's the law.

6

MR. CLINE:

Okay.

I'm n o t —
Just so you know, okay?

I don't believe that there's any

7

concept for reinstating a protective order.

8

the May 9- protective order was dismissed.

9

evidentiary--

10
11

THE COURT:

I believe that
There was an

This isn't a reinstatement.

It's a new

protective order.

12

MR. CLINE:

Okay, it was —

13

THE COURT:

The question is whether any prior acts can

14

be used in support of a new protective order.

15

reinstatement.

16

MR. CLINE:

Okay.

This is not a

Most of the issues that she's

17 J alleged that are new issues have already been -- they're issues
18

of contempt, okay, and she's listed things in there that have

19

absolutely nothing to do with the protective order.

20
21

THE COURT:

But we're not deciding contempt, and don't

worry about that.

22

MR. CLINE:

But i t —

23

THE COURT:

What they have be are incidences of

24

cohabitant abuse, and they're clearly defined, and that's what

25

you need to focus on.

-61 I

MR. CLINE:

And I'll get there in just a minute.

2

THE COURT:

Just so you know.

I mean that's all I'm

3

going to look at in terms of whether she has support.

4

that I found contempt does not of itself give any support to the

5

protective order petition.

6

MR- CLINE:

The fact

Well, and actually your Honor, it would

7

constitute an additional punishment for contempt, and the statute

8

is very clear that I (inaudible) $1,000,

9

doesn't even allow an award--

10

THE COURT:

In fact, the statute

I agree, except that a protective order

11

is not a punishment.

12

or don't do something.

13

looking for instances -- conduct that would be a form of

14

cohabitant abuse which has to support the issuance of protective

15

order.

16

A protective order is an order to cease
But that's not what we're doing.

I mean Mr. Wall said a very telling thing.

We're

You need to

17

realize this.

He has seen a lot of protective orders alleging a

18

lot less.

19

shout, for example, but you don't need physical contact.

20

that create a reasonable apprehension of physical threat, and

21

that's why history matters here because what we have is a

22

context, and the context is is there here a climate of threat,

23

intimidation, et cetera that would cause the petitioner to

24

consider your actions to be more threatening than they might

25

without that context.

They do.

You can get a protective order based on one

That's where the history comes in.

Actions
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MR. CLINE:

And I would petition the Court, your Honor,

2

that if you go back and you look at the history, in every single

3

incident that she h as alleged, she's the one that started the

4

incident at genesis

She's the one that came in screaming, "I

5 I have a protective o rder against this man.

You have to get him

6 I out of here. //
7

THE: COURT: Uh-huh.

8

MR. CLINE:

9

The —

I mean -- and I want to address this

just for a second because it was never ever addressed.

Okay.

10

The initial protective order that she had, she listed that I had

11

beat my son, Robert

12

THE; COURT:

Uh-huh.

13

MR. CLINE:

She listed that I had pushed Robert down

14

onto the concrete and I had slaimied his head into the ground and

15

that I had sat on him.

16

tria 1 which Robert 1testified, Alexis testified, Julie testified

17

and the CP5 worker <all testified.

Okay.

We went to a hearing which was a

18

THE, COURT:

Was this in juvenile court?

19

MR. CLINE:

It was in juvenile court.

20

THE COURT:

Okay.

21

MR. CLINE:

Okay.

It was on October 17th.

In my motion

22

you' 11 see a copy o f that order.

23

findings of the Court and that they dismissed it all.

24

was no violence against Robert.

25

You'll see a copy of the
There

In fact, Robert testified that, "Dad didn't throw me on

1

the concrete,

2

threw me on the bed."

3

arms against me I took his arms and put them behind his back and

4

I said, "When you settle down I'm going to let you up out of

5 [ here."

Okay,

I was trying to assault my mom and dad took me and
And because he was trying to throw his

I wasn't abusing my son.

Okay.

It was used

6

against me to get a protective order, and it's typical of every

7

single thing that has gone on in this*

8 I

Okay.

She takes an incident and she takes and blows

9 | this up out of proportion, okey, and quite honestly, I think
10

she's a pathological liar, okay, because she's been able to do

11

this over and over and over and over again, and I've got incident

12

after incident.

13

that are specific lies that I can prove, okay.

14

I've got 17 incidents in here in her petition

The Court —

the legislature allows you to use an ex

15

parte protective order on the condition that if you can prove

16

that she lies that she be charged with a felony.

17

got 17 of them.

18

20

25

If you think you have that evidence you take it to the

MR. CLINE:

I tried to get it to the district attorneys.

I've tried before,

23
24

Well, you understand, I don't charge

district attorney.

21
22

And I've

Just—

THE COURT;

19 I felonies.

Okay.

THE COURT:
works.

Well, I'm just saying that's the way that

You're right.
MR. CLINE:

There is that penalty.

And—
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THE COURT:

But I still have to look at today whether

2

there are incidents that support the issuance of the order.

3

why don't you just focus on anything in the claim —

4

petition that postdates the agreement to dismiss the first

5

the last one.

6

MR. CLINE:

And

in the
—

Well, I would like to make one thing clear

7

first of allf because she alleged that I pushed her in the

8

closet, okayr and I did not*

9

on the board our closet so that you could see exactly what

And I wish I could go up and draw

10 I happened, your Honor, because she did not deserve the original
11
12

protective order.
We have a six-by-eight closet, okay.

It's a walk-in

13

closet and there was no door on it.

All I did is lean on the

14

dresser that was outside of the door.

15

call it an argument, started while we were sitting at the bath --

16

she was in the bathtub and I was sitting on the toilet.

The argument, if you could

She had

17 I asked me to bring some eye makeup •— some eye remover so she
18
19 I
20

could take her makeup off while she was sitting in the tub.
I took a phone call.
I don't know if —

21 I protective order.
22
23
24

THE COURT:

I came back in, and this is ail --

you said that you got a copy of the original
Did you get a copy of my response to it?
Well, original.

I have five of these.

Which one do you mean?
MR. CLINE:

Yes.

I'm talking about the one from May 1 : \

25 j I filed about a six or eight page affidavit, and in there I also

-101 j filed an affidavit from my sister that showed that the day before
2

this event occurred that Julie had told ray sister that she didn't

3 I believe that Earl was going to be able to go to a baptism on
4

Saturday of my niece.

5

prior to the fact—

6

THE COURT:

In other words, Julie knew about this

Can we focus on incidents in this case

7

subsequent to the last order, because you need to understand I'm

8

fairly constrained by the law.

9

I believe they occurred, and if even one of them occurred I issue

10

the order.

11

If these incidents occurred or if

That's what the law says.

Your complaints about lies and all the rest, you're

12

going to have to take that to a different place unless they can

13

show me that I shouldn't believe anything that's been said in

14

this

case.

15

MR. CLINE:

Well, the discipline of the boys was

16 I dismissed, and yet she brings it up again.
17

it.

She has a copy of

She was there at the hearing,

18

THE COURT:

Well, a lot of things were brought up again.

19 I I want you to focus on the things that have occurred allegedly
20

since the last order,

21

MR, CLINE:

She's alleged that Kevin Brown--

22

THE COURT:

That what occurred?

23

MR, CLINE:

She's alleged that Kevin Brown was at the

24
25

hearing.

Kevin Brown was never anywhere near the hearing.
THE COURT:

Which hearing?
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MR. CLINE:

She alleged that on the October 11^' that

2

Kevin Brown was there and pleaded that the children not be

3

allowed to testify, and that's absolutely false, your Honor.

4

THE COURT:

That's the hearing at the juvenile court,

5 ]

MR. CLINE:

Yes, but yet she brought this in and used

6

that as somehow that I had harassed her and this is a current

7

issue.

Okay.

She uses it -- and let me just —

let's just go to

8 I the -- I'm going to go through the pages that -- and I apologize.
9

I mean she's written six to eight pages here, and you're asking

10 j me to spend five minutes and—
11

THE COURT:

Well, take what you need, but focus.

12

MR. CLINE:

— a n d try and go through all of this stuff.

13

Okay, paragraph —

the first page, all right.

It says 1 often

14

discipline the boys excessively by beating them with a belt,

15 I throwing them against walls and sitting on them to restrain them.
16

That was already heard in a trial in juvenile court and it was

17

dismissed, and it was dismissed about six weeks ago.

18

Okay.

She says she's been forced to call the police to help

19

resolve those situations.

20

pinned down and said, "Julie, Robert needs to go for a time out.

21

Will you please go call the police while I hold him because he's

22

not going to settle down."

23

the police and she's making -- I mean againf this is all

24

(inaudible) .

25 I

Again, I was the one that had Robert

I didn't excessively —

she did call

She says I stalked a boyfriend for the entire 17 years
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of the marriage.

Okay.

That was already heard on May 9~-\

2

fact, all of the stuff in the history -- every single bit of it

3

was heard on May ST-h. There was a —

4

was denied.

5

heard every bit of it in an evidentiary hearing and it was all

6

denied.

she filed a petition.

Okay.
THE COURT:

Now that's t h e —

8

MR. CLINE:

If you look at it, it's —

9

THE COURT:

I'm looking at it.

A very short minute

It says, v For reasons stated on the record petition for

10

entry.

11

protective order filed by petitioner is denied."

12

2002, and then they refer to the divorce case.

13

there's an evidentiary hearing?
MR. CLINE:

17

ordered us to come m
THE COURT;

That's May 9,
But you say

We did have an evidentiary hearing in front

15 I of Commissioner Casey and she —
16

It

We went in for a hearing and Commissioner Casey

7

14

In

it was denied, but he still

for an evidentiary hearing.
What I don't see in that file is any order

18 I resulting from that hearing or anything signed off on by the
19 I judge, so I don't know how you have an order of res judicata.
20

MR. CLINE:

21

responsibility t o —

22

THE COURT:

Well, I —

it wouldn't have been my

Well, I'm saying the last thing in there are

23

the minutes for the protective order.

24

judgment on the merits.

25

MR. CLINE:

Understood?

But--

That is not a conclusive
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THE COURT:

2

MR* WALL;

I mean i f —
I might indicate, your Honor, that

3 1 Commissioner Casey's comment was he wanted Commissioner Evans to
4

hear it

5

MR. CLINE:

6 1 okay.

He wasn't even there in attendance.

7
8

Steve didn't -- wasn't in attendance there.

MR. WALL;

Nof but that's —

I'm relating what my

client--

9

THE COURT:

Okay, thank you.

10

MR. CLINE;

Okay.

Continue, Mr. Cline.

It says that I filed false police

11 ] reports against her on June 14th, okay. On this one — and I
12

skipped the other stuff about blatant lies against her family

13

and all.

14

garage.

15

my car.

16
17

None of this is abuse,
It's not abuse.

THE COURT:

I stole the Mazda cut of the

It's not anything to do —

and it was

But don't you understand that even a

trespass» can be domestic violence abuse?

18

MR. CLINE:

If I had permission to go there--

19

THE COURT:

That is not what I think I found at the last

21

MR. CLINE:

No, but we had evidence submitted—

22

THE COURT:

Nof but I found to the contrary.

23

MR. CLINE:

That's fine.

24

THE COURT:

Weil, I mean that's what you're stuck with.

20

25

hearing.

That is res judicata.

This Court determined that you did not, so
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that's where you're stuck on that one.

2

MR. CLINE:

3 I okay.

It says that I filed false police reports,

The family party was on the 13th.

It was on Friday night,

4 I It was Father's Day weekend and it was my weekend and I allowed
5

her to take the children up on her week -- on my weekend to go up

6

and —

because she had a wedding, a belated wedding reception,

7 j okay, and I allowed her to do that.

And then she called me up

8

and said, "Do you mind if they spend the night Friday and we'll

9

get them back to you on Saturday."

10

Robert was there.

Believe it or not I had been trying

11

very hard to get Robert to establish a relationship with his

12

mother, okay, and so I insisted that he go to that and -- in

13 J spite of the fact that he was very angry and was very frustrated,
14

I sent Robert up there and they would not allow him to

15

spend the night.

16

had a wonderful time with my grandfather."

17

see my uncles.

18

spend the day with my aunts and uncles and cousins and everybody

19

else?''

20

He got up the next morning.

He said, "Dad, I

He said, "I got to

Will you please drive me up there so that I can

I called up and I got permission, okay, and she said,

21

"If you bring Robert up why don't you take the rest of the kids."

22

So I drove all the way up there.

23

and I pulled clear away from the house because there is a

24 J restrain —
25

I'm sitting there parked

—

there's a mutual restraining order between myself and

Mrs. Packard.

But it says that we can go to any kind of family
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parties or baptisms as long as we stay away from each other and

2

we don't argue with each other.

3

that restraining order. Mrs* Packard didn't even come out.

So I was not in violation of

4

I'm sitting there waiting for Sierra who had -- they

5

couldn't find her shoes, and I was waiting there for about 20

6

minutes when David comes out, and he and I are sitting on my car

7

watching the boys and laughing and joking about some things. All

8

of a sudden Robert comes out of the house going, "Let's get out

9

of here. Dad-

10

Grandpa is being an asshole," Excuse me. But

that was his exact words•

11

I said, "What's going on, Robert?" He says, "Grandpa

12

is in there being an asshole again."

I said, "All right, let's

13

get the kids and let's get out of here." He sat in the car.

14

Mr. Packard comes running out of the house.

15

shoulder and throws me up against the car with five of my

16

children sitting in the car and says, "Let's—" he said, "When

17

are you going to tell the children the truth about all of the

He grabs me by my

18 I crap in this divorce and the liens that you have placed on this
19

home." Okay.

20 I

He did throw me up against the car, and I had to drive

21

five —

six children home in my car -- actually five because Josh

22

stayed up there. All those children came home in tears, okay.

23

And I asked my mom to be here, but she apparently had something

24

else, so she can testify to how incredibly upset those children

25

were that their grandfather came out yelling at their dad and
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threw him up against the car.

And I have written statements at

2 J home from Robert and Joshua that say that that m
3

fact happened.

Not only do I have written statements, but the next

4

day -- that Monday —

5

get him —

6

she took Joshua into Kevin Brown to try and

get Joshua to say that that didn't happen.

Well, I called Kevin Brown a couple of days later, which

7

is my right granted by court order, and I called Kevin Brown and

8

he said, "You know what was funny, Joshua came in and Julie sat

9

in there and tried to coax him into saying that that event didn't

10

happen."

He said, "As soon as Julie left Joshua came clean and

11

told me, 'You know what, grandpa did push him.

12

Okay.

13
14

So this crap that I made this stuff up, okay, this is
incredible, you know.

They call the police on me anytime I come

15 I anywhere near their house.
16

I saw it.'"

He comes out screaming at me, telling

me that I need to tell my children the truth about something,

17 I which would have gotten me in contempt of court for talking with
18

them about the issues, then throws me up against the car, okay,

19

and because he gets, you know, David and everybody else up there

20

to lie to the police officer when Joshua actually told Kevin

21

Brown the truth, okay.

22

And if you want to get Kevin Brown on the phone —

I

23

mean I know you're not going to do that, okay, but we could get

24

Kevin Brown on the phone and he could tell you exactly what

25

happened.

I intend to come back with an affidavit from Kevin.
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I'm going to subpoena that, okay, to show the type of stuff that

2

she has —

3 I

that she has gotten.
She uses that I intimidated and harassed her by --

4

because she was asked to come to a court hearing.

5

goodness, you know.

6

have the right to face my accusers.

7

Okay.

8
9

Okay.

My

If she wants to be there as the accuser I
It's a constitutional law.

But she goes on for an entire half a page here about
ail of the —

how the Judge was wrong in his decision because he

10

dismissed the charges and that I put the children up to do this

11

and that.

12

shows that I didn't subpoena Alexis.

13

all.

14

testify but she agreed to do it.

15

In that motion that you can't find, your Honor, it
Alexis wasn't subpoenaed at

She came voluntarily by phone and she didn't want to

My only counsel to her wasf "Alexis, if you want to

16

testify, you feel free to do that, and your dad will love and

17

care for you no matter what happens." And if I got the

18

transcript of that and brought it in here you can see that I

19

asked her about three questions and one of them was, "What did

20

your dad tell you about this —

or about testifying.''

She said,

21 Iu You told me, dad, that you'd have to cross examine me, that
22

you'd try to be very, very careful and cautious and that you

23

would respect my feelings and that you would respect me for

24

whatever I testified to."

25

Okay, that is -- it's on the record in juvenile court.
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It's on the record that Robert testified that none of this abuse

2

happened,

3

Alexis testified none of this abuse happened.
THE COURT:

See, even if all of this is true, talk to me

4

about things like after you got out of jail and the conversations

5

you had that Ms. Camp found threatening.

6

talking about.

7

MR* CLINE:

Okay.

You know what I'm

And those are the only two things.

8

Okay, number one, she's gone to this issue about me talking to

9

Joshua again.

10

It's a blatant lie, okay.

Joshua called and --

well, let's go to the threat.

11

Okay, October 26' .

It's on page 4.

I had my cell phone with me.

I got out of jail,

12

okay,

I called her on the phone.

13

I said, "Where is Christopher and Robert?'' She said, "Robert has

14

taken your truck and he's gone t o — " I forget where it was.

15 I said, "Why was he allowed to take my truck?
16

truck?

He's not supposed to have it."

17

him permission to take that."

18

I

Why does he have my

I said, "I didn't give

Well, Robert is serving time down in Southern Utah

19

because of this issue while he was out of -- she said to me,

20

"What's your intentions?"

21

children, why?"

22

what your intentions are."

23

going to come beat you up?" And I don't even remember if I said

24

beat up and come and get you or something like that.

25

"I'm not.

I said, "I'm going to come pick up my

She said, "No, really what —

I need to know

I said, "What, are you afraid I'm

1 have no intention of doing that.

I said,

I just want to get
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my boys,'' okay.

All right.

2

THE COURT:

3

I'm going to do something?"

4 I

MR. CLINE:

Did you say something like, "Are you afraid

I might have done that, okay, but your

5

Honor, if —- but I said immediately thereafter, "I'm not.

6

just coming to get my boys,"

7

that's it."

8
9

Okay.

THE COURT:

Okay.

That's not abuse.

I'm

"I just want to get my boys,
It's not a threat, okay.

Well, to some extent.

A threat is how

something is reasonably perceived, and that's where we get back

10 I to where history matters.
11

MR. CLINE:

Well, then we're going to have to go back

12

through all the history and—

13

THE COURT:

Well, we've done that, I can assure you.

14

MR. CLINE:

Okay.

15

THE COURT;

I know you differ —

both of you -- on every

16

issue that's occurred between you since the beginning of time,

17

but nevertheless, we've seen

18

history.

19

of the problem.

20

world where something that may otherwise have sounded innocent

I've seen

the history, and it's a long

history in this courtroom, and that's part

The climate of hostility of escalation creates a

21 J does not seem innocent.
22

MR. CLINE;

Well, and your Honor, the only thing I can

23

ask is that at the time that we were here on the 23rd, 24*-h,

24

whenever it was of September, okay, you counseled me where you

25

said, "Mr. Cline, you don't think you need to come back and get
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her on contempt of court."

You haven't seen —

you haven't seen

2

the flip side of all the contempt issues because I haven't

3 I brought them before the Court.
4

THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

5 I

MR. CLINE:

Okay, and I can assure you, okay, that if I

6

brought those before the Court you would look at that and say,,

7

"Oh, my gosh, there's so much -- you know, it's not Mr. Cline,

8

okay, it's her over and over again arguing, she'll —

9

and then turning around and changing her testimony."

10 I

THE COURT:

you know,

And that might result in you being able

—

11

for example, just theoretically to get a protective order, but it

12

would not necessarily result in Ms. Camp not being entitled tc

13 j one unless you could show that everything she said was not true,
14

that there was no truth in any of these incidents.

15
16

MR. CLINE:

Well, I don't believe that it was ever a

threat, your Honor, okay.

17

THE COURT:

Uh-huh,

18

MR. CLINE:

It was —

19

THE COURT:

Well, you may not have intended that it was

20
21

one.

My question is how is it reasonably perceived?
MR. CLINE:

Well, and I don't —

22

absolutely no threat in it whatsoever.

23

to get the boys, that is it, okay.

24
25

you know, there was

It was just I am coming

This incident about Joshua, again, okay, she's brought
in and alleged that my mom and dad told Christopher -- and that's
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not true, either, because Joshua called my mom and dad and told

2

my dad--

3

THE COURT:

What your mother and father did is not, in

4

my view, a basis for a protective order against you unless you

5

put them up to it or something, and that does not appear to be

6

the claim in this case, so I don't think you need to worry about

7 j that one.
8

MR- CLINE:

Well, but the issue is that Joshua when he

9 I called my dad knew how long I was sentenced for, okay.
10
11

THE COURT:

But it's not an issue on the protective

MR. CLINE:

I know, but you've told me before that if

order.

12

13 1 I could show you that she has —
14

He knew--

that she is talking to those

children and putting them up to saying things against their

15 I father that you'd have her thrown in jail also.
16

THE COURT:

17

a contempt hearing.

18

narrow issue,

19

MR. CLINE:

Well, you would have —

we would have to dc

I'm saying for now we're looking at a more

Okay.

And the last incident that she's

20

got in here is that I swear in front of the children and it

21

intimidates their -- you know, this is an incident, your Honor,

22

because of what happened when I was incarcerated the last time,

23

okay.

24
25

I got Robert out.
allowed him —

On the Saturday that she had him she

he was put on house arrest through probation and
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2

wasn't to go anywhere.

She allowed him to take my truck and go

3 I to Heber and ride horses.
4

he

She then allowed him to go to his

friends where he got drunk.

5

He was called into work.

He went into work, and cf ail

6

the stupid things, Smith's sent him drunk knowing he was drunk

7

back into the —

8

kid and he's stacking beer and he steals one while he's there

9

and he puts another one —

to stack beer, okay.

And he's a 17-year-old

a 12-pack in the garbage can and

10

wheels it out.

Well, he got caught and he got fired, okay, and

11

so that's —

12

Monday morning I talk to the probation officer, Chris -- I can't

13

remember his last name.

so while he's on house arrest he ends up —

on

14

He said, "Robert is under your custody, and that means

15

that you do not let him go to the bathroom without you standing

16

at the door.7' He says,

17

signed and you are not to let him out of your sight."

18

Okay.

XH

We have a warrant that's ready to be

I took him down to register him for school hoping

19

that by getting him in school that we could -- that we could

20

soften the judge's heart and not send him off for 90 days or

21

whatever it is she was threatening to do out of home placement.

22

As we got out of there I said, "What do you want to do

23

with your television and your DVD?"

24

pick them up, dad."

25

n

Yes."

He said, "We ought to go

He said, "Can you put them away for me?"
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So I got him over theref and I called Julie and told her

2

that we were coming.

3

have 10 minutes."

4

order and I am not going to allow your mom to let me violate this

5

court order by stalling you in there."

6

need."

7

get out."

8
9

Robert goes in and I said, "Robert, you

I said, "I am not going to violate the court

I said, "That's all I

I said, "You go on in there, you get your stuff and you

Okay, at six minutes I called and said, "I don't see
Robert.

You need to hurry."

At eight minutes I called and said,

10

"I don't see Robert and you need to hurry."

11

called and said, "Julie, I said at this point if he is not out

12

here Robert is a fugitive from justice, okay, and I'm going to go

13

call the police and I will have you charged with -- I'll have

14

Robert charged with being a fugitive from justice," because his

15

probation officer said, "Don't you let him out of your sight."

16

She was screaming over the phone, "You can't do this.
It's ™

At ten minutes I

17

You can't take his stuff.

you know, it's not his."

18

All -- yada, yada, yada, all sorts of stuff at me, okay.

19

"That's fine,

20

West Jordan Police Department and I'm going to have them come out

I said,

I'm going to go down and I'm going to call the

21 I here and get in the middle of this because Robert is supposed to
22 J be with me and he is supposed to have his stuff, okay.
23
24
25

You can't

withhold his stuff from him*"
Okay.

At that point I left to go get a phone book.

When I came back Robert had his stuff on the ground, okay, and
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she came out of the house screaming at me, "If you even dare cash

2

that check of his--" and I said, "I don't even have his check,"

3

His check didn't come until that Friday.
She said, "Robert signed papers in there and he's going

4
5

to have you charged with a felony," and she's done all of this,

6

you know, on and on and on and on and on and she is screaming at

7

me, okay, at the top of her lungs in front of Robert.

8

comes out of the stairs, "I'm going to do this, I'm going to have

9

you thrown in jail.

As she

I'm going to have you this and that and

10

that," and I turned around as I was leaving and I said, "Why

11

don't you just go to hell," okay, and that's the extent of it.

12

Okay.

I know you're going to say, "Oh, there we go.

13 I Escalation."
14

THE COURT: Not alone.

Not that alone.

Can you hold

15

just one moment before you continue because we may be able to lee

16

these other people leave on these other matters.

17

(Court handles other matters)

18

THE COURT:

Mr. Cline, you just said that, you know, you

19

said, "Why don't you go to hell," or something and that then I'd

20

say, "Well, there you go." Well, I wouldn't, but there are other

21

factors, and we could talk all day, which everyone in this case

22

seems capable of doing*

23

have been designed by the legislature to give people some peace

24

of mind and some protection if they are threatened, are abused in

25

any way in a domestic violence sense or under reasonable

But the bottom line is protective orders

-251 J apprehension of physical harm.
2

Although a lot of these incidents are old, although

3

quite a few of them I agree do not amount to cohabitant abuse,

4

in the totality, in the climate that has been created by both of

5

you -- I mean this is not —

6

create this climate.

7

done -- some of the things you have said, including specifically

8

the comments after your release from jail the first time could

9

reasonably be construed in this Court's opinion as threats or

it takes more than one person to

But within this climate the things you have

10

intimidation that is simply prohibited by the cohabitant abuse

11

statute,

12
13

Based on that I find there is a basis for issuance of a
protective order.

I am going to issue a permanent protective

14 J order, and you have to make appropriate motions at any time that
15

you feel you have evidence to do so to change or modify the terms

16 I of that order.
17
18

Otherwise dismissal will not occur unless by

stipulation of the parties.
Mr. Wall, there is a form as you are well aware.

If you

19

don't have one with you you can probably pick one up on the first

20

floor, but I will ask you to prepare a form order -- it's simple

21

that way for the officers —

22

parte order.

23

different than the ex parte order?

and just to make it track the ex

Is there anything you're looking for that's

24

MR. WALL:

25

MR. CLINE:

No.
Your Honor--
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2

THE COURT:

One moment, sir, and I r ll come back to you.

Do you have the ex parte order in front of you, sir?

3

MR. CLINE:

Yes,

4

THE COURT:

Are there any specifics in the ex parte

5

order that you think could be changed that have impact on your

6

ability to deal with the children?

7

MR, CLINE:

Yes, quite honestly.

She —

8

she's asked for her personal possessions back.

9

place--

10

THE COURT:

first of all,
This is not the

Well, and generally it's not, but since

11 II have both cases, there —

most of them shouldn't still be

12

at issue this late in the case.

13

talked about for some time, like the last item, the patriarchal

14

blessing, let me ask you, do you have any of these things?

15
16
17

MR. CLINE:

Other things that have been

She has her own patriarchal blessing.

I had

a photocopy of the patriarchal blessing.
THE COURT:

Well, you're not entitled to keep one if she

18

doesn't want you to, but on this list, I agree that this may not

19

be the place, but what do you have of hers that's on this list?

20
21

22

MR. CLINE:

Her journals I've given back to her, except

for one journal which I'm using as evidence because it's —

THE COURT:

Weil, you don't get to keep it, though.

23

would you get to keep it?

24

evidence, b u t —

25

MR. CLINE:

Why

You may have a basis to copy it for

That's all -- I'd be happy to give it to
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her.

2

that we were supposed to hear today.

3

recorder.

4

I gave back to her.

5

THE COURT:

But there's at least one you still have you

MR. CLINE:

That's the one that she listed as day

6

I have copies of it and they're submitted in that motion

I testified that I gave that back to her.

8

planner.

9

fictitious.

10

Her sister's email -- again, this was completely
Her sister brought boxes—

THE COURT:

I don't want a big argument.

I want to know

if you have it or don't have it.

12
13

The journal

say?

7 I

11

I don't have the tape

MR. CLINE:

I don't have them.

The Mazda Miata I do.

It's titled and registered in my name—

14

THE COURT:

I'm holding that issue until another day.

15

MR. CLINE:

And I didn't steal that.

16

THE COURT:

Well, we'll talk about that later, but I'm

17

not going to order in this —

18

order.

19
20

in connection with the protective

That will have to be addressed through the divorce.
MR. CLINE:

Any children's clotnes that I have

purchased, your Honor—

21

THE COURT:

That she has purchased.

22

MR. CLINE:

Yes.

For six months, your Honor, I've had

23

clothes and she's had clothes and we've sent them back and forth

24

and back and forth and neither one of us cared as long as they

25 I came in clean clothes because we knew eventually we'd get them
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back again,

2

THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

3

MR. CLINE:

And that's the basis that we've operated on,

4 1 and then all of a sudden a couple of months ago she got a wild
5 I hair and decided that she wanted t o —
6

THE COURT:

Do you have many clothes for the children?

7

MR, CLINE:

Do I have many clothes?

8

THE COURT:

I mean some odds and ends are no big deal,

9

but if you have a stack of them that's another story.

10

MR. CLINE:

Of her clothes?

11

THE COURT:

The children's clothes that she purchased.

12

MR, CLINE:

No.

No.

And quite honestly I couldn't even

13

tell you which ones were which.

14

contempt of court order because she says that I have a t-shirt

15

that I don't even know is hers or whatever.

16

THE COURT:

The last thing I need is a

Well, and you both should have clothes at

17 I both places.
18
19

MR
parents.

20 I members.
21
22
23
24
25

CLINE:

Okay.

Any personal items that belong to her

I don't have anything from her parents or other family
If she wants the copy of her patriarchal blessing—
THE COURT:

She wants all the copies in your possession.

You have no reason to have that.
MR. CLINE:

And I can get it by going down to the church

office building and they'll give me a copy of it.
THE COURT:

Well, that would be pretty outrageous.
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MR. CLINE:

How's th?t?

2

THE COURT:

Why would they give out someone's private

MR. CLINE:

Because you can go down and get a —

3

blessing 1

4
5

you can

go down and ,sign a piece of paper and get a copy.

6

THE COURT:

Get anybody's patriarchal blessing?

7

MR. CLINE:

Yes.

8

MR. WALL: Well, that's not true, your Honor.

1

9

MS. CLINE:

That's not true.

J

10

MR. CLINE:

It is.

11

THE COURT:

Well, that's between the other parties and

It is.

I've done it.

12

the LDS Chur<3h, but I would find that rather shocking to say the

13

least.

14

MR. CLINE:

Well, I've done it, s o —

15

THE COURT:

Did you represent yourself as her husband

16

when you did it?

17

MR. CLINE:

No, my mom has been able to get them for

18

brothers and things like that, too.

19

because mine had been lost.

20

mine.

21

1

THE COURT:

Okay.

She got a copy of mine

She also -- Julie has a copy of

But you know, sir, I just told you to

22

return your .Last copy and you said to me, ^Well, I can go get

23

one from the church anyway."

24

so total ly inserting3 yourself into your ex^wife's life

25

inapprop riately and why that might be intimidating to somebody?

Do you see why I think you are

1
1
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MR. CLINE:

I'll be happy to give it back.

2

THE COURT:

No, I'm asking you, do you see why a comment

3

like that makes me sit here and say, "This guy isn't getting it.''

4

I'm telling you to butt out of her life.

5 I

MR. CLINE:

And I'm trying, your Honor.

6

THE COURT:

Weil, that's a good step.

I seriously—
"I'll go to the

7 I church and get a patriarchal blessing directly from the church
8

because no one is going to stop me getting what I want that's

9

personal to her."

10

what's m

it.

Now I know you've read it.

I know you know

It's not going to be news to you.

But my point is

11 I when you're told to get out of it, all you say is, "I've got
12

another way, Judge.-"

13

introspective here.

14

MR. CLINE:

I'm ]ust saying be a little bit
Do you see why that's an issue?
Your Honor, if I didn't have seven children

15

with this woman I would love to go and move to a completely

16

different state and get the hell o u t —

17
18

THE COURT:
both parents to.

Sir, what you have is seven children you're

You'll never divorce the children.

19

MR. CLINE:

That's —

20

THE COURT:

You're divorced from Julie Camp.

21 I not your wife.
22

friend.

She is not your sweetheart.

That's pretty obvious.

She's not even your

Get unentangled.

23

MR. CLINE:

I would love to, okay.

24

THE COURT:

Okay.

25

MR. CLINE:

All of the issues —

She is
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Statement of All Persons, Whose Interests Might be Substantially
Affected
Persons who may be affected by this writ are:
1.

Earl Cline II, Respondent in Divorce

2.

Julie Marie Camp, Petitioner in Divorce.

3.

Michelle Bloomquist, Guardian ad Litem

4.

Steve Wall, Attorney for Petitioner frf Divorce.

Statement of Issues Presented and Relief Sought

Steve Wall is counsel for Julie Camp in this divorce case. He should
be dismissed from the case for Conflict because he previously agreed to
represent Earl Cline and then obtained confidential information from him.
He then violated his oath of confidentially by disclosing Hiat to Jiiie, Her
Mother and veilf possibly used it with the Guardian ad Litem early on in the
case. Even if he didn't a'gree to a client relationship as he tried to state, he
violated Rule 4.3 which states u(a) During the course of a lawyers
representation of a client, the lawyer shall not give advice to an
unrepresented person other then the advice to obtain council, (b) in dealing
on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by council, a

lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresenteted person
misunderstands the lawyers role in the matter, the lawyer shall make
reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding."

Statement of Facts

1.

In the summer of 2001, on or about July 27, 2001, Earl and
Julie were separated and a suggestion had been made that both
should go to counseling and that Julies parents should attend.
Steve Wall called on or about July 26, and was enquiring of Earl as
to some of the issues involved in the separation. Julie and Earl,
had both been very involved in helping Steve with Julies brother,
Neil's divorce in which Steve represented Neil. Steve and Earl
spoke for about an hour about various issues related to alleged
abuse of Robert, issues of Julies parents in the marriage, financial
issues surrounding the business, etc. Earl specifically asked Steve
prior to any discussion if he would be able to file a simple uncontested divorce action where he represented both of us. He said
that he would. At that point Earl believed that anything that he

told to Steve was confidential and should not be told to other
parties.
2.

On or about July 27, 2001 Earl picked up a divorce packet from
Steve Walls office. On July 29, 2001. Earl spent the night with
Julie and woke up in the morning to go to a listing appointment.
When he returned on July 30, at about 12:00 P.M. Julie was very
upset. As it turned out Steve has called and spoke with Julies
Mother and disclosed all sorts of issues that Earl had told Steve
about including Earls feelings that Julies mother was trying to ruin
the marriage. Many of the issues that Julie told Earl about were
word for word as he had told them to Steve. On or about August 1,
2001, Earl got a hold of Steve and he acknowledge that he had
spoken with Julies Mother and admitted that he had told her some
of the things that Earl and Steve had spoken about. They spoke
again about issues of the marriage and he offered to try and
mediate between Julie, her parents and Earl. Steve suggested that
Julie and Earl also go to counseling. Respondent told him about a
lot of the counseling that had already been done, and some of the
recommendations of those councilors. At that point Earl told him
that he felt like that would be a conflict of interest for him to
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council us and then represent us in a divorce, he stated that he
wouldn't be willing to do that anymore. Earl expressed
disappointment that Steve had chosen to disclose what was thought
to be information protected by client confidentiality privilege.
Respondent sent an e-mail to the Office of Professional Conduct
on or about Aug. 6, 2001. The decision was made at the time not
to pursue an action against Steve as Earl was trying very hard to
save his marriage and any new issues would have caused further
conflict. About six months later Julie filed for Divorce in District
Court and asked Steve Wall to represent her.
3.

In Motion for Temporary Orders filed on or about May of 2002,
Earl made a Motion through then Counsel to the Court that Steve
be dismissed for a conflict. To Earls knowledge that issue was
never addressed by the Court. In an evidentiary hearing held on
Sept 22, 2003, Judge Hilder herd about the previous request to
have Steve disqualified and stated that Earl needed to bring a new
formal Motion. In November of 2003 Earl made a formal motion
to the court for the dismissal of Steve and on December 17, 2003 a
hearing was held in Judge Hilder's Court. After Steve and Earl
were sworn, and both testified, court made the following ruling.
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"Respondent has not met his burden of showing that an
attorney/client relationship was ever commenced between
Respondent and Mr. Wall. It is not credible that a family
lawyer of Mr. Wall's experience would consent to joint
representation under the circumstances as stated by
Respondent or even if things were going aiong smoothly
because things change. In fact, this case has a history of
problems and had not been going along smoothly for over a
year before the alleged contact between Respondent and Mr.
Wall occurred."
"I find there was a contact and information shared however,
even if an attorney/client relationship was established which I
find it was not, the court finds the most critical information
shared, that being information concerning Alan, was already
provided through other sources. Therefore, using this
information has not and would not be to respondent's
disadvantage in the sense that it was acquired through
confidential sources such as respondent alleges." With that
Judge Hilder refused to disqualify Steve.
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Earl maintains that Court was in error for not dismissing Steve. In
Poly Software v. Yu Su, 880 F. Supp 1847, Courts ruled on what it
takes to disqualify opposing counsel for conflict. "In order for a
party wishing to disqualify opposing counsel on grounds of former
representation to demonstrate that opposing counsel previously had
implied attorney client relationship with party. Under Utah Law,
party must show that it submitted confidential information to
lawyer and that it did so with the reasonable belief that lawyer was
acting as party's attorney." (See Points of Authority for rest of
cases and rulings that support this petition). In fact Nelson v.
Green builder Inc. 823 F. Supp. 1493, it states; "Party establishes
implied attorney-client relationship if it shows that it submitted
confidential information to the lawyer and that is did so with the
reasonable belief that lawyer was acting as parties attorney". On
that basis the court already found enough reason to disqualify
Steve.
Typically Courts apply a very strict standard of proof when
evaluating evidence to refute existence of client relationship and
should resolve any doubt in favor of disqualification. {LaSalle
Nat 7 Bank 703 F.2d 257). If Steve is allowed to continue on in the
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case, Earl will not be able to have a fair trial. Court Ruled that a
disqualification would result in a significant interruption to the
course of justice. Earl maintains that the fact that Steve didn't
disqualify himself early on in the trial has already lead to a
"significant interruption to the course of justice". Ignoring that
fact will not fix the issue, but will only allow the problem to
continue to perpetuate its-self.

Statement of Reasons for Needing this Remedy
During the hearing on December 17, 2003, Judge Hilder set a trial
date for March first and second. A couple of days later, he sent a memo in
which he refused to hear any motions for reconsideration or any other
motions till the day of trial. At that point it will be two late to do anything
about this issue., and irreversible damage will be done to Earl and his chance
for a fair trial. This is truly the only way to get justice at this point.

Memorandum of Points of Authority
Poly Software v. Yu Su, 880 F. Supp 1847
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[2] Party wishing to disqualify opposing counsel because of a former
representation under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, must demonstrate that a
previous attorney-client relationship arose with the moving party; that
present litigation is substantially factually related to previous representation;
and that attorney's present client's interest are materially adverse to movent.
[3] In order for a party wishing to disqualify opposing counsel on grounds of
former representation to demonstrate that opposing counsel previously had
implied attorney client relationship with party. Under Utah Law, party must
show that it submitted confidential information to lawyer and that it did so
with the reasonable belief that lawyer was acting as party's attorney.

Cole v, Raisoso 43 F.3d 1373
[26] Threshold question for court when ruling on motion to disqualify
opposing counsel on ground of former representation is whether there was
attorney client relationship that would subject opposing counsel to ethical
obligation of preserving confidential communications and for these to have
been attorney client relationship, party need not have executed a formal
contract nor is existence of relationship dependent upon payment of fees;
however, movent must show that it submitted confidential information to the
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opposing counsel and did so with the reasonable belief that counsel was
acting as movant's attorney.
[27] To protect client confidentiality, party moving for disqualification of
opposing counsel on grounds of a former representation need not reveal the
substance of its communication to counsel for this would defeat purpose of
disqualification; usually showing of circumstances and subject of
consultation will be enough to demonstrate whether information was
confidential.
Threshold of Reasonableness of Belief
Nelson v. Green Builder Inc. 823 F. Supp. 1439
[4] Party establishes implied attorney-client relationship if it shows that it
submitted confidential information to the lawyer and that is did so with the
reasonable belief that lawyer was acting as parties attorney.
[5] To create attorney-client relationship it is not necessary that parties
execute formal contract, or that relationship be dependent upon payment of
fees; fiduciary relationship may arrive solely from nature work performed
and circumstances under which confidential information is divulged.
[6] Lawyer may not switch sides in substantially related representations;

10

[7] Representation is substantially related to prior representation when
lawyer could have obtained confidential information in first that would have
been relevant in second.
[8] If substantial relationship is found between present and prior
representations, it is unnecessary for former client to prove that lawyer
actually received confidential information and used it against him or her;
more-over, attorney or party need not divulge any conflicts to prove that
thev were revealed.
[9] Substantial relationship test for disqualification requires three-part
inquiry. First, scope of prior legal representation must be factually
reconstructed; Second, court must determine whether it is reasonable to infer
that confidential information allegedly given would have been given to
lawyer representing client in prior matters; Third, court must decide whether
that information is relevant to issues raised in litigation pending against
former client.
[10] If the court finds that the representation are substantially related, then
presumption arises that lawyer received confidential information during his
or her prior representation.
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[11] When a lawyer switches sides in litigation, presumption of shared
confidences is irrebuttable and thus disqualification is proper, absent consent
of, or waiver by former client.
pp. 1448 "The courts apply a very strict standard of proof when evaluation
evidence offered to rebut the two presumptions of shared confidences on a
motion for imputed disqualification. This heavy rebuttal burden is satisfied
only with "clear and effective" proof. Moreover the court resolves any
doubt at to the existence of and asserted conflict of interest in favor of
disqualification "LaSalle Nat'l Bank 703 F.2d 257, (citing Gulf Oil, 588,
F.2d at 225)"".

Dalrvmple v. Nat. Bank and Trust Co of Traverse City, 615 F, Supp.
979
[l]In determining whether attorney client relationship has been created,
focus is on client; subjective belief that he is consulting a lawyer in his
professional capacity, and on his intent to seek professional legal advice.
[2] To disqualify counsel on basis of conflict of interest between former and
present clients, it is first necessary to show that attorney-client relationship
exists or has existed between counsel and the party seeking disqualification,
but not necessary that a strict contractual relationship exists, as relationship
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may be implied, and foremost among underlying concern is the possibility of
attorneys disloyalty and breach of faith towards one who is previously
entrusted him with confidences.
[7] Inquire in cases in which disqualification of attorney brought on grounds
of previous representation of opposing party is whether attorney was in
position to acquire confidences of his clients; the actual receipt of such
confidential information is irrelevant.
[8] Implied attorney client relationship exists whenever lay party submits
confidential information to an attorney whom he reasonably believes is
acting to further his interests
Kearns v. Fred Lavery/Porsche Audi Co, 573 F. 91

[1] The attorney-client privilege attaches and one is considered a client,
whenever one consults a lawyer with the view to obtaining professional legal
services.
[2] Attorney who represented defendant in patent infringement case and
who had consulted with plaintiff in a suit against same patents was
disqualified from further representation of defendants because he had
received confidential information concerning the other, substantially related
case; for attorney to continue his representation would have involved breach
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of his fiduciary obligation and would have undermined integrity of attorney
client privilege.
pp.95 "and in Schloetter v. Railoc of Indiana Inc., 546 F.2d 706 it was held;
The basic policies underlying and judicially-compelled withdrawal of
counsel because of potential conflicts of interest can be found in canons 4
and 9 of the ABA code of professional responsibility ... Read together, the
two cannons indicate that an attorney may be required to withdraw form the
case where there exists even an appearance of a conflict of interest.
Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.6 (a) states "a lawyer shall not reveal information relating to
representation of a client except as stated in paragraph (b) unless the client
consents after consultation."
Rule 1.7 states "A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of
the client will be directly adverse to another client, unless: (1) the lawyer
reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the
relationship with the other client; and (2) Each Client consents after
consultation.
Rule 1.8 (b) states "A lawyer shall not use information relating to the
representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client
consents after consultation.
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Rule 1.9 states "a lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter
shall not thereafter: (a) represent another person in the same or substantial
factually related matter in which that person's interests are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client consents
after consultation; or ...".
1.16 states that "a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation
has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if; (a)(1)
the representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct
or other law".
For all of these reasons Respondent prays that this petition will be granted as
it is in the best interest of Justice.

Signed this j/j d ada*
y , of ' ^ ^ , 2004

Pro Se Appellant
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Ju«Jtos.l District

STEVEN B. WALL, NO. 3 679
WALL & WALL, a.p.c.
Attorney for Petitioner
4460 South Highland Drive, Suite 20C
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Telephone: (801) 274-3100
Facsimile: (801) 365-8223
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Deputy Oerfc

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATS OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
JULIE MARIE CLINE,
ORDER ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO
MODIFY TEMPORARY ORDERS

Petitioner,
vs.
EARL LAVERE CLINE, II,

Civil No. 024902228 DA
Respondent.
Judge Robert K. Hiider
Coram. Michael S. Evans
Respondent's

Motion

regularly for hearing
Robert

K. Hiider,

present,

to Modify

on December
District

Temporary

17, 2003,

Court

Judge.

Orders

cair.e on

before the Honorable
The

Petitioner was

in person and through counsel, Steven B. Wall.

Respondent was present, appearing Pre Se.

The

The Guardian Ad Litem,

Michelle Biomquist was present appearing on behalf of the minor
children.

All parties having made argument and proffers to the

Court, and the Court having reviewed the pleadings and the concents
of che file and being fully advised in the premises, the Court made
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
'Alt. A VVA; I ;A,P.C.)
T'tRNTYSATSAVV
SOl-Htd W AND l>=JiVt
-•2tX)
,A<1 Ci'X I'TAH 84124

With respect to Respondent's Motion to Disqualify the

J|
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Guardian Ad Litem, the Court finds the allegations of abuse are
still very much at issue; that no conflicts have been shown and no
other legal basis exists to disqualify said Guardian Ad Litem's
office generally or Guardian Ad Litem Blomquist, specifically.
2.

With

respect

to Respondent's

motion

to

disqualify

Petitioner's counsel, Steven B. Wall, the Court finds that when an
opposing party challenges a party's right to be represented by the
counsel of their choice, the Court must look at the motivation of
the party requesting the removal.
3.

Respondent has not met his burden of showing that an

attorney/client relationship was ever commenced between Respondent
and Mr. Wall.

It is not credible that a family lawyer of Mr.

Wall's experience would consent to joint representation under the
circumstances as stated by Respondent or even if things were going
along smoothly because things change.

In fact, this case has a

history of problems and had not been going along smoothly for over
a year before the alleged contact between Respondent and Mr. Wall
occurred.
5.

I find there was a contact and information shared,

however, even if an attorney/client relationship was established
which I find it was not, the Court finds the most critical
information shared, that being the information concerning Alan, was
already provided through other sources.

Therefore, using this

information has not and would not be to Respondent's disadvantage
in the sense

that it was acquired through confidential sources such
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as Respondent alleges. Respondent disclosed this same information
himself to Petitioner, who then disclosed it to others.

So the

disadvantage didn't arise by Respondent's disclosures to Mr. Wall.
Therefore, the Court finds no attorney/client relationship existed,
no

information

was

given

exclusively

through

that

alleged

relationship and used to Respondent's disadvantage and finally
recognizing both of these factors and a person's right to choose
his or her own counsel, the status of this case and ultimately the
best interests of the children, the Court finds that a significant
interruption to the course of justice would occur to delay these
proceedings

further by a disqualification when everyone needs

resolution, particularly the children.

As an aside, even if the

Court found an attorney/client relationship and the use of the
information contrary to Rule 1.9 of the Rules of Professional
Conduct,

the Court

would

still

have

serious

concerns

about

disqualification, however, the Court finds that this situation
doesn't even get there.
Based thereon and based upon the findings of the Court and
good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HERE3Y ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Respondent's Motion for Disqualification of the Guardian

Ad Litem's office and/or Guardian Ad Litem, Michelle Blomquist is
denied.
2.

Respondent's Motion for Disqualification of Petitioner's

counsel, Steven B. Wall, is denied.
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3.

Neither party is allowed to file their 2003 tax returns

unless the parties agree in writing on how the parties divide the
children as exemptions.
4.

Respondent has ten (10) days from Decerriber 17, 2 003, to

file his objection to Petitioner's request for attorney's fees as
requested in her Order on Contempt Hearing Held September 24, 2003,
and to Petitioner's proposed Order on the hearing held November 25,
2003.
5.

All

other

issues

in Respondent's Motion

to Modify

Temporary Orders is reserved to final trial.
6.

Respondent is to provide Petitioner's counsel a copy of

the certificate which certifies he is eligible to ordain the
parties' minor child, Joshua, to the office deacon.

The foregoing Order on Respondent's Motion to Modify Temporary
Orders, has been submitted to the Court for execution and entry.

9.1

5
Rule 4-504(2), Code of Judicial Administration, allows five (5)
days following hand-delivery, or ten (10) days if service by mail,
for the opposing party to submit notice of objection.

If such

objection, as to form, is not received within the subscribed time
period, said Order will be executed by the Court.
DATED this

3LI

day of

/Xc^Uy^cyf/^'1

. 2003.

k>ny

EN B. WALL /
Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing/Order on Respondent's Motion to Modify Temporary Orders,
sent via^facsimile
viayfacsimile
was [j/j mailed, postage prepaid, [ ] sent

l i t ^ Lflayof

transmission, [ ] hand-delivered on thi
2003, to the following:

Earl Lavere Cline, II
Respondent/Pro Se
1565 East 7200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY

Motion to Amend
Judgment and or Ordor

JULIE MARIE CLINE
Petitioner,
Vs.

Civil No.: 024902228DA
Judge Robert K. Hilder
Commissioner Michael S. Evans

EARL LAVERE CLINE II
Respondent.

)

Respondent Pro Se herby presents Motion to Amend Judgment and or Order, per rule
59 (7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which was ordered on December 17,
2003, on the grounds that there was error of Law.
Respondent begins by acknowledging receipt of Judge Hilders interim ruling in this
case, that he will respond to no more motionsfromeither party, til! the time of trial.
But with that said, Respondent still feels that to maintain hisrightsto appeal in this
case that this motion is necessary. Therefore he is responding for the record.
Respondent also argues the fact that at this point in the case, the Interim ruling is
probably a violation of Due Process as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the constitution of the United States for the various reason which will
be enumerated below.
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4.

Respondent feels like it is discriminatory against him for various reasons including;
Petitioner was allowed to file an incredibly lengthy volume of papers in her Motion
for Order to Show Cause Dated April 11,2003.( 98 pages long). No decision was
made by the court at that time that limited her access to the courts. She was then
granted an opportunity to have her side told in a three day evidentiary hearing, and
subsequently in two review hearings and a Protective order hearing. Court has
specifically objected to motions from Respondent because of the length of them.
Respondent notes that the specific Order that Respondent was objecting to was 14
Pages long. Affidavit for Attorney fees was also six pages long. Respondent is
merely responding to the volumes of paperwork that Petitioner has written. In any
event the court avoiding a decision on the issues raised in those motions for reconsideration serve no valuable purpose except to delay Respondents access to his
constitutionally protected right to appeal those decisions of the Court, that
Respondent believes are patently in error.

5.

This continues to keep Respondent held illegally in states custody by not allowing
him the right to do many things that he would normally be entitled to if he didn't have
the allegation of past due child support over his head. For example, Marriage is a
right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Because of Respondents religious
beliefs, he can not be granted permission to re-many in accordance to his religious
beliefs, till he is current on child support Surprisingly, if he is allowed to re-marry it
may help all of his children, but it is most assuredly in the best interest of Chris and
Robert. Marriage may also help Respondent financially to recover from all the issues
that have combined to destroy his finances over the last two years ofthis divorce.

2
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Delaying a decision on the issues with the guise of benefiting the children is really
hurting them.
6.

Judgment of past due child support also prohibits Respondent from getting a better
job. I am not sure how that is benefiting the children or anyone else in this case.
Respondent could come up with many more reasons why the courts decision violates
the rights of due process and other civil rights as guaranteed by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. The charge of Discrimination based
upon Sex has already been make in this case. In the interest of time he will reserve
those till later.

7.

Court argued that another reason for not addressing the child support issue is that
"Respondent has un-clean hands". If that is the case, then why did Petitioner get
Respondent sent to Jail for Contempt of Court when each and every allegation that
she made against Respondent, she was in violation of court orders first, (see Affidavit
in Support of Order To Show Cause, by Respondent). Even with respect to the child
support issue. Petitioner has un-clean hands as she admitted that at one time she was
working at the real estate business with Respondent, and has now stopped.
Respondent has had to work harder just to make up for her refusal to work. She also
knowingly provided a false and fraudulent affidavit attempting to overstate how much
money Respondent made. Commissioner Evans even stated on the record that he
knew she was lying.

8.

At this point the court has sentenced Respondent to four days in jail while knowing
that the child support order may be illegal, and when there was no written order upon
which to have him committed. (Rule Since then Respondent was committed to

3
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another twenty six days when at that time the court knew that the order was in
violation of state and federal law. This has now subjected all partes to this divorce to
the possibility of Malicious Prosecution, and other civil rights damages. Does any
one believe the court has un-clean hands? Or are they just delaying the decision
hoping to find some way to get out of the damage they have caused. At this point the
courts action is continuing to keep Respondent in State Custody illegally in violation
of USC 28 Section 2254, which allows filing of writ of Habeas Corpus in Federal
Court. This courts action to delay the decision is unnecessary and should be reconsidered as it is in violation of federal law. All the legal work has been completed,
all the court has to due is make a decision so that the parties can move on with there
lives as soon as possible. This is really in the best interest of the children also. The
court seems to forget that Respondent has charge of some of the minor children and
the courts are really hurting those children by their actions.
9.

With respect to the issue of dismissing the guardian ad litem, Respondent objects to
the court not dismissing her as an error of law. The allegation of Child abuse against
Respondent was fraudulent as CPS worker prior to divorce dismissed those charges
and Guardian ad Litem Anthony Ferdon was involved in and knew what happened.
When the charges re-appeared after Michelle Bloomquist talked to CPS worker it is
evident that they were done to discredit Respondent in Divorce Court The fact that
Guardian Ad Litems office was involved originally in the dismissal of those charges
is evidence of fraud on the part of the guardian ad litem as the making of fraudulent
child abuse charges is a crime per state law. Even if Michelle wasn't a party to
making up the new charges, she had enough knowledge to know that CPS was in

4
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violation of the law. The interesting thing is that she has advocated over and over
that the allegations of child abuse are hurting her clients, the Cline children, yet did
she really do anything to protect them from this abuse by CPS. NO. That alone
should be enough to have her dismissed for fraud and for not reporting a crime that
was designed to hurt her clients. The malicious intent of CPS and the Guardian ad
Litems office was so blatant that one of the CPS workers got caught lying in sworn
testimony in court and it is documented in the dismissal order. Everyone wants to
blame Respondent for the ugliness of the divorce, but even the courts have some
reasonability because they have made orders on un-supported allegations, and then
refused to fix them later when the allegations are proven to be false.
10.

But if that is not enough to justify a bias, look at the temporary orders that have been
generated. Orders about seat belts, (at the time Respondents car was too small to
transport all children at one time). Orders about spanking of children. {No order
about wrapping them in duck tape or throwing them against the wall and damaging
their shoulder, or throwing phones at them, or scratching their arms and leaving
permanent scaring). Orders about taking their medicine. (No orders that the children
continue to go to church in their mothers care). Christopher lives with his mother for
several months and allegedly has continual problems with being aggressive with the
children. After Respondent gets custody of him, Michelle recommends an order that
Respondent has to keep him away from the other children. Why wasn't it
recommended while Julie had custody of him. Alexis misses eight weeks of her
Junior year of school. Christopher while living with his mother misses almost one
half year of school. Ciera and Erika are compulsively late or missing in action at

5
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school. Mom gets Josh excused from school for almost six weeks after the summer
when he returned back to live with his mother. Alexis goes to only half of her classes
the first half of her senior year and completely drops out the second half of her senior
year. Respondent knows for certain that at least once in that time period that
Michelle received a call from Mary Bailey, the head of Jordan School District
attendance and still we don't have a single order even proposed by Michelle that the
children need to go to school. Right now the children who are living with Petitioner
have been out for over two months and again, we don't have any recommendation
from the guardian ad litem that the children should be in school. Could this have
anything to do with the fact that Christopher has almost perfect attendance while
living with his father. And we suil don't see that she has a bias or been neglectful in
her duties to protect the children. I don't think so.
11.

Courts decision not to disqualify Steve Wall is also in error of law for the following
reasons. Paragraph two of purported findings of fact in purposed order from
December 17,2003 hearing stated "when opposing party challenges a party's right to
be represented by the counsel of their choice, the court must look at the motivation of
the party requesting the removal". For the Record original motion was made by
respondent with the very first paperwork filed in this divorce. Court argument that
"at this late date it would only delay the process", is week given that the court is the
one that twice already ignored Respondents motions to have Steve disqualified.
Respondent also maintains that State law in relation to Lawyers Rules of Professional
Conduct, should out weigh Petitioners right to have the council of her choice.
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12.

In paragraph three of Proposed Order, court alleges that "Respondent has not met his
burden of proof \ The evidence used to support this was one of an argument of
reason. For the record, Respondent testified very clearly and succinctly as to events
that happened. That testimony included statements that Steve and Respondent not
only talked about "Allen", but also talked about work history, marriage counseling,
financial issues and more. Respondent has no idea whedier that information was used
early on to his detriment, while Steve spoke with the Guardian ad Litem or others
involved in the case. Steve could only testify as to what he believed he would do in
that situation. Obviously on its face Respondents testimony was more credible than
Steve's. The argument that "It is not Credible that a family lawyer of Mr. Wall's
experience would consent to joint representation..." is flawed also. Would a lawyer
of Mr. Walls experience knowingly allow his client to commit fraud by transferring a
marital asset to her parents, when he should have know that it was in violation of state
law and by so doing may enable Respondent to include Steve in law suit against
Petitioner and her parents. It may also allow his legal file to be opened in discovery
because of his knowledge of and possible participation in a crime. Would an
experienced Guardian ad Litem of Michelle's experience really allow CPS workers to
commit fraud and turn their clients lives upside down without trying to stop it?
Would a District Court Judge with the experience and reputation equivalent to that of
Judge Hilder really send someone to jail on an illegal child support order that is in
violation of State and Federal Law? Would an attorney of Steve's caliber continually,
and knowingly allow his client to commit perjury in court? I think the argument is
flawed and court should have dismissed Steve on the Representation issue alone.
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13.

Rule 11-101 States that Article VIII of the Utah Constitution gives the Supreme Court
authority to make rules of Lawyer Conduct. That makes them a rule of law. Any
rules that have "Shall and Shall Not" are imperatives. Rule 1.6 (a) states "a lawyer
shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client except as stated in
paragraph (b) unless the client consents after consultation/' None of paragraph (b)
have any thing to do with this case. Therefore Steve had no excuse to release that
information to Mrs. Packer.

14.

Rule 1.7 states "A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of the client
will be directly adverse to another client, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes
the representation will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and
(2) Each Client consents after consultation. Neither of those would be reasonable in
this case.

15.

Rule 1.8 (b) states "A lawyer shall not use information relating to the representation
of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client consents after
consultation.

16.

Rule 1.9 states "a lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter: (a) represent another person in the same or substantial factually related
matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the
former client unless the former client consents after consultation; or ...". The next
part qualifies how a lawyer can use information if it becomes commonly known as
Judge Hilder was trying to show how the information Steve was told about Allen
didn't apply because the information had become known. For the record 1.9 (a) still
does not give the lawyer the right to represent another person adverse to his previous
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clients interest even if information becomes known. Also Petitioner told his wife
Julie about the information, but per rule 502 or the Utah Rules of Evidence, he had a
right to try and maintain that information as privileged. Petitioner and Steve both had
no right to tell Mrs. Packer about it, yet confidential information is used against
Respondent all the time by the Packers in their court cases.
17.

Rule 1.16 states that "a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has
commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if; (a)(1) the
representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other
law".

18.

Finally if all this is not enough to get Steve dismissed look at rule 4.3 which states
"(a) During the course of a lawyers representation of a client, the lawyer shall not
give advice to an unrepresentative person other then the advice to obtain council, (b)
in dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by council, a
lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresentative person misunderstands
the lawyers role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the
misunderstanding." If as the court seems to want to conclude, that there wasn't a
Client relationship established, then Steve clearly violated an imperative in Rule 4.3
in which he had an inappropriate conversation with an unrepresented person, in the
which he did a number of things with Respondent that he shouldn't have based upon
his contention that Respondent was not represented by counsel. For this reason alone
Steve should be disqualified.

9

31

19.

Finally one of the real difficulties of this case is that when ever anyone want to do
something that is clearly discriminatory in a divorce, thcv usually use "protection of
the children" as an excuse for their actions. In this case Respondent has part of the
children so the arguments that the discrimination is to protect the children fly in the
face of reason. Anything which hurts Respondent also hurts the children, specifically
Robert and Christopher who live with him.

20.

For the reasons stated above Respondent respectfully requests that: 1. Court
reconsider Respondents motions with regard to child support issues, as not addressing
them is in violation of Federal Law and Constitutionally protected rights, and 2; Court
reconsider Respondents request to have Michelle dismissed as her continued presence
guarantees that Respondent will not have a fair trial and the children will suffer for
this, and 3; Court should reconsider the request to have Steve Wall dismissed.
Delaying these motions will not bring a speedy and fair resolution to this case, but
only guarantees that the fighting and legal battles will live on in Supreme Court and
Appellate Court Appeals, and possibly into the Federal Courts. These motions are
clearly in the interest of Justice and the best interest of the minor children.

21.

Respondent reminds the court that Article VI of the Constitution states "This
Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof.... Shall be the Supreme Law of the Land: and all State Judges shall be bound
thereby'1.

Respectfully Submitted This /^-Day of J * ^

200^

Respondent (Pro Se)
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